What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
years?

I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
made cheaply.

LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
(useful intel for the missile controllers).

Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
could be used).

Another application would be to make it re-usable, i.e. a UAV rather
than a CM. Mount a machine gun in it, and let it roam around over
the battlefield taking pot-shots at anything that moves. Or use it
to give targetting data for artillery.

Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

(phil hunt) nattered on
. org:

> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?

Orbital laser satellites, preferably mind-control lasers. If not that,
then frickin' sharks with frickin' laser beams in their heads.

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?
>
> I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> made cheaply.
>
> LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
> supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
> approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
> to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
> This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
> system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
> recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
> could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
> vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
> simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
> (useful intel for the missile controllers).
>
> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> could be used).
>
> Another application would be to make it re-usable, i.e. a UAV rather
> than a CM. Mount a machine gun in it, and let it roam around over
> the battlefield taking pot-shots at anything that moves. Or use it
> to give targetting data for artillery.
>
> Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
> sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
> slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
> be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
> minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
> faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
> "get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
> by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
> weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.
>
> --
> "It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
> people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
> (Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
> the last two letters).
>
>

cheap dirty nukes . if you got 'em use 'em

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?
>
> I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> made cheaply.
>
> LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
> supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
> approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
> to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
> This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
> system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
> recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
> could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
> vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
> simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
> (useful intel for the missile controllers).

This is really not as simple as you make it out to be. The US military
services are still wrestling with ways to compress the sensor/shooter cycle,
and with fielding weapons capable of handling mobile/time-sensitive targets.
In view of that, the likelihood of any likely foe developing a similar
capability in the near terms (and that really is the next ten years, if not
longer) is remote.

>
> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> could be used).
>
> Another application would be to make it re-usable, i.e. a UAV rather
> than a CM. Mount a machine gun in it, and let it roam around over
> the battlefield taking pot-shots at anything that moves. Or use it
> to give targetting data for artillery.
>
> Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
> sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
> slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
> be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
> minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
> faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
> "get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
> by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
> weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.

Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
contractors.

Brooks

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 04:15:51 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
>> LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
>> supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
>> approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
>> to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
>> This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
>> system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
>> recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
>> could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
>> vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
>> simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
>> (useful intel for the missile controllers).
>
>This is really not as simple as you make it out to be. The US military
>services are still wrestling with ways to compress the sensor/shooter cycle,
>and with fielding weapons capable of handling mobile/time-sensitive targets.
>In view of that, the likelihood of any likely foe developing a similar
>capability in the near terms (and that really is the next ten years, if not
>longer) is remote.

I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
involved in the decision to fire.

The second is when the sensor is in one place, and the shooter
somewhere else; in those situations, what problems have the USA
encountered, and how have they gone about solving them?

>> Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
>> sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
>> slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
>> be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
>> minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
>> faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
>> "get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
>> by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
>> weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.
>
>Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
>the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
>contractors.

Because they are more technologically advanced. Some technologies,
for example high performance jet engines, require a large industrial
base to make. The sort of technologies I'm talking about are ones
that can potentially be produced a lot more cheaply, for example by
adapting mass-produced (but nevertheless highly sophisticated)
consumer products. Any medium-sized power should be able to produce
embedded computer control systems.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:54:46 GMT, Bryan J. Maloney > wrote:
(phil hunt) nattered on
. org:
>
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>Orbital laser satellites, preferably mind-control lasers.

Crewed by Alien Space Bats, presumably?


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

phil hunt wrote:

> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?

Something you don't bring up, but which is very important in being able
to analyze your question, is exactly what goal the opponent would have.
Would it be to invade the USA (taking the USA as the obvious archetype
of the scenario)? Would it be to thwart USA forces engaged in some
existing conflict on your soil until the war becomes so unpopular at
home that they are forced to withdraw? Would it be to goad them into a
conflict to do the same? What is the smaller force trying to
accomplish?

--
__ Erik Max Francis && && http://www.alcyone.com/max/
/ \ San Jose, CA, USA && 37 20 N 121 53 W && &tSftDotIotE
\__/ He who can, does. He who cannot, teaches.
-- George Bernard Shaw

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 04:15:51 GMT, Kevin Brooks >
wrote:
> >
> >"phil hunt" > wrote in message
> . ..
> >> LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
> >> supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
> >> approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
> >> to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
> >> This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
> >> system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
> >> recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
> >> could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
> >> vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
> >> simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
> >> (useful intel for the missile controllers).
> >
> >This is really not as simple as you make it out to be. The US military
> >services are still wrestling with ways to compress the sensor/shooter
cycle,
> >and with fielding weapons capable of handling mobile/time-sensitive
targets.
> >In view of that, the likelihood of any likely foe developing a similar
> >capability in the near terms (and that really is the next ten years, if
not
> >longer) is remote.
>
> I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
> attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
> there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
> involved in the decision to fire.

That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous combat
systems. The closest thing we have to that in service are the intelligent
antiarmor submunitions, which are already in service in cluter munitions to
include WCMD dispensers, and will soon be available as a warhead option for
the Army's ATACMS missiles. But they still require a sensor in the loop,
because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and hit
anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the target
is right at the time the weapon arrives. Now if you want to send a flock of
CM's out and about to go on a hunter-killer mission, you have some real
problems to confront, like: (a) How do you prevent fratricide or targeting
of the local version of the Sanford garbage truck (remember that not every
enemy is going to be able to discount collateral damage like the insurgents
we are no facing in Iraq do)? (b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit, but
which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to most
potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
navigation system) or up high where the view is better, but also where it
becomes easy meat for the layers of Patriots and Avengers fielded by the
resident duckhunters, along with any covering Aegis controlled Standards in
the littoral zone, and the ubiquitous F-15/F-22 CAP? and, (c) Development of
a reliable, compact, onboard sensor suite that provides enough resolution to
find likely targets, and a darned intelligent software package to handle
target discrimination (from background clutter, earlier posited garbage
truck, etc.), and can also recognize an entire range of potential targets
and select the one you would want hit from amongst all of them. Sorry, but I
don't see ANY potential foes we might face in your near term overcoming one,
much less all, of those hurdles, and I am sure I have missed a few more.

>
> The second is when the sensor is in one place, and the shooter
> somewhere else; in those situations, what problems have the USA
> encountered, and how have they gone about solving them?

Then you have to have a good secure datalink, and as it stands now the only
folks that are likely to have those during the near-term are us and our good
friends. The best currently fielded US system of this nature is the SLAM-ER,
with ATA--think of an extended range Harpoon with an ability to send its
sensor images back to either a launch aircraft or another suitable platform,
and which responds to that platform's commands to acheive retargeting or to
allow more discriminative targeting. IIRC the new Tactical Tomahawk will
also offer an inflight retargeting capability. You will note that the
current trend in the US, which is the undeniable leader ins such
capabilities, is to retain the man-in-the-loop at present, and that will not
significantly change during the period you have set forth, so I seriously
doubt Underwhatsistan is going to be able to do any better.

>
> >> Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
> >> sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
> >> slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
> >> be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
> >> minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
> >> faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
> >> "get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
> >> by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
> >> weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.
> >
> >Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
> >the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
> >contractors.
>
> Because they are more technologically advanced. Some technologies,
> for example high performance jet engines, require a large industrial
> base to make. The sort of technologies I'm talking about are ones
> that can potentially be produced a lot more cheaply, for example by
> adapting mass-produced (but nevertheless highly sophisticated)
> consumer products. Any medium-sized power should be able to produce
> embedded computer control systems.

If it was that easy, others would be doing so already--they are not. Heck,
look at the Storm Shadow ALCM--a good system, but in no way is it verging on
the system brilliance you envision for this asymetric uber-weapon, and Storm
Shadow is the best that is offered by our European allies, who are, while
generally a bit behind the US power curve in this area, light years ahead of
the rest-of-the-world (possible exception of Israel, but if you take the
Popeyes we got lynched into buying from them as an example, not too great
either). Sorm Shadow/Scalp are already enjoying export success because the
rest of the world can't do a better job on their own--the only way they get
any capability like what you refer to is by buying from those western
industries you rather prematurely wrote off.

Brooks

On Wed, 17 Dec 2003 21:18:19 -0800, Erik Max Francis > wrote:
>phil hunt wrote:
>
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>Something you don't bring up, but which is very important in being able
>to analyze your question, is exactly what goal the opponent would have.
>Would it be to invade the USA (taking the USA as the obvious archetype
>of the scenario)? Would it be to thwart USA forces engaged in some
>existing conflict on your soil until the war becomes so unpopular at
>home that they are forced to withdraw? Would it be to goad them into a
>conflict to do the same? What is the smaller force trying to
>accomplish?

This is a good question, as what you're trying to do affects what
you need to do to do it.

Let's consider possible adversaries, and what their aims might be.

Iran.
- deter US invasion of their country
- prevent US or Israeli air raids against their country (LCCMs won't
really do this, but other asymetric techniques might be able to)
- in the event of US military action, be able to inflict
unacceptable losses on US warships in the area
- deter Israeli air raids by the ability to strike back against
Israeli cities (updated V1 idea; modern V1s would be much more
accurate and could e.g. hit targets of opportunity)


Saudi Arabia.
- same as Iran, really


China.
- ability to cow other regional powers by superior force
- ability to successfully launch a land invasion against North
Korea, Russia/Siberia, Kazakhstan, or Vietnam
- naval invasion against Taiwan
- ability to destroy hostile (either regional power or US) shipping
in seas near China
- ability to intimidate Japan or other reasonable powers with
V1-style weapons


India and Pakistan
- use against each other; western powers might conceivably join in
- V1-type city bombing


Algeria or Libya
- attack Europe or Israel with V1-type weapons; use threat of the
above to prevent the west interferihng in their countries
- control Mediterranean


South Africa
Is not likely to attack anyone, but might want to maintain force
dominance compared to a coalition of regional powers against it
(e.g. Zimbabwe + Libya + Angola). ZA also has a largish weapons
industry with a record of making decent wepaons on a tight budget,
so may well manufacture LCCMs for export.


Indonesia
- war with Australia, whicvh inevitably would have a naval
component, so anti-shipping use. Also maybe anti-city use


Singapore
- to maintain a defense posture of "we're not going to attack
anyone, but if you attack us..."


Taiwan
- aerial bombardment of China. How many people would die if the
3 Gorges Dam was destroyed?


South Korea
- to deter China. Also for export.


Other countries that might develop LCCMs might include Brasil,
Argentina, Chile (balance of power against each other), and Thailand
and Malaysia (BoP). In all these countries cases, becasue they're
fun toys to play with that are cheap. (More formally: because the
general staffs and defence ministers of these nations will gain
status by being involved in developing what are seen as cutting-edge
high technology weapons, and it won't put too big a hole in the
defense budget to do it).


Russia and Ukraine might develop them for export potential.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?
>
> I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> made cheaply.
>
> LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
> supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
> approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
> to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
> This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
> system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
> recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
> could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
> vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
> simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
> (useful intel for the missile controllers).

Without getting much into the technical end of this discussion (which other
posts have already done), it is safe to say that pretty much any cruise
missile system built 'on the cheap' (especially by second and third-world
standards) would be so obsolete at the time of its deployment that existing
and near-future US countermeasure systems will easily detect and deter their
success. Do you think that you are the only one who thought of this? The DoD
is very much aware of the cruise missile threat.

>
> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> could be used).

While 'swarming' ships with cruise missiles could possibly overwhelm their
anti-missile systems, it is still not a feasible plan for an effective
weapon system. Think about it; how many missiles would be needed to get
through the anti-missile defenses and still cause major damage? 75? 100?
More? Per ship? Where are all of these missiles going to be set up and
launched from, and how are you going to keep them from being destroyed by a
B-2 in the first 10 seconds of the war?

You see, US weapons platforms are not designed purely as stand-alone
systems; each has specific mission parameters towards accomplishing an
overall goal. US surface ships can't defend against 100 cruise missiles
because because they dont have to; other missions and branches of the
service ensure that. Which is why it would be futile to set up a base and
launch system to send of hundereds of these missiles at once; it would
easily become target #1 on the hit list. (which is probably also why nobody
has done it)

Of course, unless they planned to use this strictly as a one-time only sneak
attack method for starting a war; then the tactic could meet some success.
But they would be hard pressed to not tip their hand prematurely, and wind
up with a visit from the B-2 before the facilities were even completed. And
even if by chance thy managed to pull something like that off, it would be a
suicide mission on a national scale, as the country who launched the attack
would become a parking lot within 48 hours.

>
> Another application would be to make it re-usable, i.e. a UAV rather
> than a CM. Mount a machine gun in it, and let it roam around over
> the battlefield taking pot-shots at anything that moves. Or use it
> to give targetting data for artillery.

It would be detected and shot down before it got a single shot off. Or it
would take one shot, then get shot down. The reason US UAVs don't get shot
down is because they either, 1) utilize low-observable (stealth) technology
(which is way beyond the capabilities and budget you've set), or 2) operate
in an environment in which we've gained air dominance, set up jamming, and
largely eliminated the surface-to-air threats (none of which is likely to
happen against the US). And even after all of that we still lose a few. So
what chance would anyone else have?

>
> Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
> sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
> slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
> be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
> minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
> faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
> "get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
> by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
> weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.

During Gulf War I we approved, designed from scratch, tested, certifiied,
manufactured and fielded the GBU-28 in under a month to counter a specific
target. When a job needs to get done, it's surprising how fast we make
things happen.

Aside from that, US technology is literally quantum leaps beyond anything
that a potential adversary could acquire in the near-term, especially on the
cheap, as you are suggesting. There would have to be a massive technological
infrastructure to simply get to where we are, much less "get inside the
decision curve" of the US military. It just isn't feasible... and thats
exactly how we want it.

From a warfighting standpoint, there really is no way to take us on
directly, regardless of anything you've postulated in this post. The best
way to go about any kind of counter-strike against our forces is to get
about 10,000 guys, give them each some kind of RPG or shoulder-launched AT
missile, and let them scatter all over the place and make random attacks. It
still won't stop us, but it is the only hope of at least inflicting some
damage occasionally.

Thomas J. Paladino Jr.
New York City

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?
>

Instead of trying to build *up* to defeat a western/Nato/US opponent, the
only possible solution would be to build *down*, and grow self aware,
mobile, small scale explosives.

A 20 year old with a backpack full of C-4, as is done now.

Pete

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:54:46 GMT, "Bryan J. Maloney"
> wrote:

(phil hunt) nattered on
. org:
>
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>Orbital laser satellites, preferably mind-control lasers. If not that,
>then frickin' sharks with frickin' laser beams in their heads.

Well, if we're being silly - How about a modern version of "The Mouse
that Roared"?

Send an elite troop of longbowmen to capture the negatively charged
stranglet that was just created at fermilab.

Then hold the world for ransom for whatever it is you want - universal
disarmament, foreign aid, etc.

"raymond o'hara" > wrote in message
news:KM9Eb.580420$Tr4.1558044@attbi_s03...
>

>
> cheap dirty nukes . if you got 'em use 'em
>
>

At which point your entire country becomes a glowing plain
of radioactive glass.

Great strategy there but dont give up the day job.

Keith

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?
>
>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>made cheaply.

How are you getting your position information?

The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
US, you can't count on your GPS working right.

I don't know the details of the system (one reason I'm free to post) -
but the absolute best case I can see is for you to force the US to
basically shut off the GPS system everywhere. Depending on your
weapons range, you may be able to force GPS nullification only in a
limited area (the US can probably scramble the timing when the
satellites are over the area threatened by your weapons, while leaving
the timing intact when the satellites are over "safe" areas.

Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
capability, but it would not eliminate it.

From a terrorist POV - naw, it's pretty obvious, but I'll defer
comment, no sense in making life easy for them.

"pervect" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
> hunt) wrote:
>
> >What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> >country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> >against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> >years?
> >
> >I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> >cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> >very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> >Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> >made cheaply.
>
> How are you getting your position information?
>
> The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
> control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
> US, you can't count on your GPS working right.
>
> I don't know the details of the system (one reason I'm free to post) -
> but the absolute best case I can see is for you to force the US to
> basically shut off the GPS system everywhere. Depending on your
> weapons range, you may be able to force GPS nullification only in a
> limited area (the US can probably scramble the timing when the
> satellites are over the area threatened by your weapons, while leaving
> the timing intact when the satellites are over "safe" areas.

That is a decent description of the selective availability (SA) function of
GPS. SA renders the average (non-US military) receiver incapable of
determining a precise fix, and you need precision for the kind of weapons
the poster was postulating. SA was shut down a couple of years back so that
civil users (i.e., surveyors, commercial aircraft, etc.) could take
advantage of its precision (prior to that occuring surveyors had to use what
is known as "differential GPS", a more time consuming method of achieving a
precise location), but according to the official USG website on the subject
it can be reinstituted over a particular region at will.

>
> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
> capability, but it would not eliminate it.

Actually, I don't think SA adversely affects US military systems.

Brooks

>
> From a terrorist POV - naw, it's pretty obvious, but I'll defer
> comment, no sense in making life easy for them.

Wasn't it phil hunt who wrote:

>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?

I think that any middle-ranking country that went up against USA/The
West using military weapons would get seriously stomped on. The only way
to have a chance would be to win the propaganda war, turning popular
opinion in the USA against contesting the war. Infiltrate your
supporters into the US media many years before war is likely. Be aware
that the peril of one individual that the US media can identify with is
worth an awful lot more in propaganda terms than the death of anonymous
thousands. Design any military actions with their propaganda value as
the primary consideration, ignoring conventional military value almost
completely. Employ well-equipped media crews on the ground who
understand the US media, and have them rapidly release their (edited)
footage to the guys you've got planted in the US.

"The only way to understand the battle is to understand the language.
War is as much concept as execution."

Provoke your opponents into making the first media-visible aggressive
step, and make yourself appear to be implementing passive resistance, or
using a minimal defensive response. Meanwhile, if you can find any
targets that are not media-visible (i.e. the US government can't
publicly admit that the targets exist) then attack them aggressively.

--
Mike Williams
Gentleman of Leisure

In article >,
says...
> > LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
> > supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
> > approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
> > to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
> > This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
> > system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
> > recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
> > could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
> > vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
> > simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
> > (useful intel for the missile controllers).
>
> Without getting much into the technical end of this discussion (which other
> posts have already done), it is safe to say that pretty much any cruise
> missile system built 'on the cheap' (especially by second and third-world
> standards) would be so obsolete at the time of its deployment that existing
> and near-future US countermeasure systems will easily detect and deter their
> success. Do you think that you are the only one who thought of this? The DoD
> is very much aware of the cruise missile threat.
>

Say I built heaps of multiple-rocket launchers built an improved WW2, V1
jet to hit a city say at 200 miles and then targeted them at an US ally
cities.

Aiming would be pretty trivial, most modern cities are pretty big anyway
and so what if a a lot miss? Its not like they cost me much anyway each
missile.

My missiles shot down are a lot cheaper then the anti missiles the US
uses anyway.

The make sure that this US ally is aware of your capability. That might
keep the US out of the conflict.


This strategy seems to work for the North Koreans.


--
Wealth must be produced before it can be distributed.

20th saying of Bernard

>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?

Well, it could slip a few million dollars to a charismatic religious
leader to carry out terrorist attacks on New York City.

It could also develop weapons of mass destruciton, or pretend to be
doing so.

And it could buy billions of dollars of weaponry and associated
materials from France, Germany, and Russia, so as to keep those
countries in its pocket.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Pete wrote:

> Instead of trying to build *up* to defeat a western/Nato/US opponent, the
> only possible solution would be to build *down*, and grow self aware,
> mobile, small scale explosives.
>
> A 20 year old with a backpack full of C-4, as is done now.
>
> Pete

Which is what I would suggest. No country could currently defeat the USA in a
stand-up fight. So disperse your army globally and take out US-interest soft
targets: embassies, companies, tourists, registered shipping, anything that
flies a US flag.

The losses would be sickening, and it makes me nauseous to think about the
scenario. Especially if army elements managed to get on US soil.

Simon Morden
--
__________________________________________________ ______
Visit the Book of Morden at http://www.bookofmorden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk
*Thy Kingdom Come - a brief history of Armageddon* out now from Lone Wolf

phil hunt > wrote in message
. ..

>
> Crewed by Alien Space Bats, presumably?
>

European or African alien space bats?

--

Scott
--------
Monitor the latest efforts of "peaceful Muslims" at
http://www.jihadwatch.org/

In article >,
Simon Morden > wrote:

> Which is what I would suggest. No country could currently defeat the USA in a
> stand-up fight. So disperse your army globally and take out US-interest soft
> targets: embassies, companies, tourists, registered shipping, anything that
> flies a US flag.
>
> The losses would be sickening, and it makes me nauseous to think about the
> scenario. Especially if army elements managed to get on US soil.

Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
don't think it would be that effective.

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?
[ SNIP ]

Fight an insurgency, and do it well. Plan for it, and train for it.
Pre-position necessary equipment, designate cells that people will belong to
(this could be done in such a way that even the people doing the designation
wouldn't know the specific composition of such cells, how the cell members
get into touch if the balloon goes up, or any of that). Move supplies and
weapons as soon as balloon goes up - that way, even if there is some
compromise, the stuff is no longer at A but is at B. And only the cell
members get to do the moving of the stuff.

Incidentally, the other Western countries *are* middle-ranking countries, so
this is really a "how do we defend against the US" question. Under those
circumstances I think one simply does not attempt conventional warfare - not
in the time frame you suggest. You'd lose everything you have. You allow
yourself to be occupied, then you start making life bad.

Given my suggestions, the weapons I would use are not dissimilar to what the
Iraqi insurgents are using. Except I'd expect it to be done better. And it
could be done much better. Leave the armour alone - go after the supply line
with command-detonated mines. Screw shooting down an Apache - mortar an
airfield with transport a/c on it. Use snipers that are actually proficient.
Ambush foot patrols. Destroy infrastructure. Etc etc.

AHS

In rec.arts.sf.science Michael Ash > wrote:
> In article >,
> Simon Morden > wrote:

> > Which is what I would suggest. No country could currently defeat the USA in a
> > stand-up fight. So disperse your army globally and take out US-interest soft
> > targets: embassies, companies, tourists, registered shipping, anything that
> > flies a US flag.
> >
> > The losses would be sickening, and it makes me nauseous to think about the
> > scenario. Especially if army elements managed to get on US soil.

> Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
> will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
> Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
> handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
> that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
> don't think it would be that effective.

Which is why the ideal complement to this strategy would be the intensive
development of a really effective brainwashing technology. Once your amoral
dictatorship has the ability to really deeply convince people on a wholesale
basis that the regime is worth dying for, then you're in business. Especially
since this will have the useful side benefit of greatly improving your hold
on power with the general populace, if you can apply similar technology to
them as well.

This suggests that, rather than worrying over a few piddly little nukes or
chemical weapons (which are not really useful for aggression by a small country
anyway, since they could never be actually used against any
western nation without inviting the absolute destruction of the user),
we should really be paying a lot of attention to countries that are
spending a lot of effort on making advances in brainwashing methods and
techniques.

--
Tim Eisele

"Pete" > wrote in message >...
> "phil hunt" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> > years?
> >
>
> Instead of trying to build *up* to defeat a western/Nato/US opponent, the
> only possible solution would be to build *down*, and grow self aware,
> mobile, small scale explosives.
>
> A 20 year old with a backpack full of C-4, as is done now.

Now,please. Using more dogs to sniff them out would work nicely, but
given the religious affiliation of the bomb carriers, miniature pigs
would be better. To lower costs, you could even train
rats(http://www.apopo.org/whyrats).

Karl M. Syring

"Pete" > wrote in message >...
> "phil hunt" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> > years?
> >
>
> Instead of trying to build *up* to defeat a western/Nato/US opponent, the
> only possible solution would be to build *down*, and grow self aware,
> mobile, small scale explosives.
>
> A 20 year old with a backpack full of C-4, as is done now.

Now,please. Using more dogs to sniff them out would work nicely, but
given the religious affiliation of the bomb carriers, miniature pigs
would be better. To lower costs, you could even train
rats(http://www.apopo.org/whyrats).

Karl M. Syring

Michael Ash wrote:

> Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
> will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
> Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
> handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
> that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
> don't think it would be that effective.

Of course. I 've no idea of your background, but AFAIK suicide terrorism is very
much a minority sport. November 17, IRA, INLA, Bader-Minhoff, and most of the
worlds' terrorist/ex-terrorist organisations much rather killed their 'enemies'
than themselves. A bombing campaign by a cell is a much better use of human
resources.

If the Elbonians weren't a bunch of brainwashed dictator-run conscripts, but a
professional nationalist army who were dedicated to supporting their government
against external aggressors, who saw the futility of getting mown down by US
airpower, who absconded with man-pack SAMs and explosives and decided to take the
fight to the capitalist pigs <foam> <slaver> <rant>

The question was how would a middling country take on a super power. There's no
reason to assume the 'middling country' is begging to be invaded, its army complete
pants, and that its citizens don't love their country as much as you love yours.


Simon Morden
--
__________________________________________________ ______
Visit the Book of Morden at http://www.bookofmorden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk
*Thy Kingdom Come - a brief history of Armageddon* out now from Lone Wolf

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 06:08:14 -0600, tscottme > wrote:
>phil hunt > wrote in message
. ..
>
>>
>> Crewed by Alien Space Bats, presumably?
>>
>
>European or African alien space bats?

Neither. But I suppose they could be Europans.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

In article >,
phil hunt > wrote:
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 04:15:51 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>>
>>Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
>>the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
>>contractors.
>
>Because they are more technologically advanced. Some technologies,
>for example high performance jet engines, require a large industrial
>base to make. The sort of technologies I'm talking about are ones
>that can potentially be produced a lot more cheaply, for example by
>adapting mass-produced (but nevertheless highly sophisticated)
>consumer products. Any medium-sized power should be able to produce
>embedded computer control systems.
>
I do not know about anti-ship missiles, or anti-aircraft missiles, but an
anti-vehicle (except tank) missile that combines a portable TV, a
pen sized camera, two diode laser TXRX sets, an RC aircraft on steroids, and
a six mile spool of optical fibre should be possible. While hardly a threat
to tanks, if they were all available in Iraq, coalition casualties might have
unpalatable numbers. The users lofts it over the hard cover that he is hiding
behind and uses its camera to find a target and then dives the missile into
it. Probably only a few thousand dollars worth of parts.

On 18 Dec 2003 08:31:14 -0500, Timothy Eisele > wrote:

>In rec.arts.sf.science Michael Ash > wrote:
>> In article >,
>> Simon Morden > wrote:
>
>> > Which is what I would suggest. No country could currently defeat the USA in a
>> > stand-up fight. So disperse your army globally and take out US-interest soft
>> > targets: embassies, companies, tourists, registered shipping, anything that
>> > flies a US flag.
>> >
>> > The losses would be sickening, and it makes me nauseous to think about the
>> > scenario. Especially if army elements managed to get on US soil.
>
>> Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
>> will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
>> Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
>> handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
>> that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
>> don't think it would be that effective.
>
>Which is why the ideal complement to this strategy would be the intensive
>development of a really effective brainwashing technology. Once your amoral
>dictatorship has the ability to really deeply convince people on a wholesale
>basis that the regime is worth dying for, then you're in business. Especially
>since this will have the useful side benefit of greatly improving your hold
>on power with the general populace, if you can apply similar technology to
>them as well.
>
>This suggests that, rather than worrying over a few piddly little nukes or
>chemical weapons (which are not really useful for aggression by a small country
>anyway, since they could never be actually used against any
>western nation without inviting the absolute destruction of the user),
>we should really be paying a lot of attention to countries that are
>spending a lot of effort on making advances in brainwashing methods and
>techniques.

This has already been done. They call it "religion".

Al Minyard

(phil hunt) wrote:
>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?

The most sensible strategy is not to get involved in such a war to
start with.

>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>made cheaply.

Guidance systems depend on *much* more than simply their computers.
You also need the inertial components, or their analogs, and *those*
are going to be hard to obtain in large quantities, especially at any
useful accuracy level.

<snipped various fanciful uses>
Many of these depend on the West not deploying something it's
exceedingly capable at; Electronic warfare and countermeasures.

>Faster weapon system design mewans it could
>"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
>by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
>weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.

Problem is, the Western powers can get inside this curve faster than
the medium nation can. The factories, power grid, etc of the medium
nation can be taken out within a few weeks to months via manned
bombers, or our own cruise missiles. Vital components produced
overseas can be stopped via blockade.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
.. .
> > I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
> > attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
> > there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
> > involved in the decision to fire.
>
> That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous
combat
> systems. The closest thing we have to that in service are the intelligent
> antiarmor submunitions, which are already in service in cluter munitions
to
> include WCMD dispensers, and will soon be available as a warhead option
for
> the Army's ATACMS missiles. But they still require a sensor in the loop,
> because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and
hit
> anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the
target
> is right at the time the weapon arrives.

I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy. It
is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and even
there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing or
procuring).

The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors (TV,
IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on some
signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at not
killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).

> Now if you want to send a flock of
> CM's out and about to go on a hunter-killer mission, you have some real
> problems to confront, like: (a) How do you prevent fratricide or targeting
> of the local version of the Sanford garbage truck (remember that not every
> enemy is going to be able to discount collateral damage like the
insurgents
> we are no facing in Iraq do)?

That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process that
goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the weapon
autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.

> (b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
> MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
> limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit, but
> which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to
most
> potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
> navigation system) or up high where the view is better, but also where it
> becomes easy meat for the layers of Patriots and Avengers fielded by the
> resident duckhunters, along with any covering Aegis controlled Standards
in
> the littoral zone, and the ubiquitous F-15/F-22 CAP? and,

Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking about
a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively) overwhelmed.
Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
better approach.

> (c) Development of
> a reliable, compact, onboard sensor suite that provides enough resolution
to
> find likely targets, and a darned intelligent software package to handle
> target discrimination (from background clutter, earlier posited garbage
> truck, etc.), and can also recognize an entire range of potential targets
> and select the one you would want hit from amongst all of them.

If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive weapons,
you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending on
the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below 100%.

> Sorry, but I
> don't see ANY potential foes we might face in your near term overcoming
one,
> much less all, of those hurdles, and I am sure I have missed a few more.
[snip]

The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology has
progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
components).

"Dionysios Pilarinos" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> .. .
> > > I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
> > > attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
> > > there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
> > > involved in the decision to fire.
> >
> > That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous
> combat
> > systems. The closest thing we have to that in service are the
intelligent
> > antiarmor submunitions, which are already in service in cluter munitions
> to
> > include WCMD dispensers, and will soon be available as a warhead option
> for
> > the Army's ATACMS missiles. But they still require a sensor in the loop,
> > because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and
> hit
> > anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the
> target
> > is right at the time the weapon arrives.
>
> I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy. It
> is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
> significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and even
> there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing or
> procuring).
>
> The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
(TV,
> IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
some
> signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
not
> killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).

And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some second/third
world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the next
ten years? I don't.

>
> > Now if you want to send a flock of
> > CM's out and about to go on a hunter-killer mission, you have some real
> > problems to confront, like: (a) How do you prevent fratricide or
targeting
> > of the local version of the Sanford garbage truck (remember that not
every
> > enemy is going to be able to discount collateral damage like the
> insurgents
> > we are no facing in Iraq do)?
>
> That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process
that
> goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
> systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the weapon
> autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.

Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be placed
in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
FM radios is not going to work).

>
> > (b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
> > MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
> > limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit,
but
> > which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to
> most
> > potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
> > navigation system) or up high where the view is better, but also where
it
> > becomes easy meat for the layers of Patriots and Avengers fielded by the
> > resident duckhunters, along with any covering Aegis controlled Standards
> in
> > the littoral zone, and the ubiquitous F-15/F-22 CAP? and,
>
> Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
about
> a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
> anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
overwhelmed.
> Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
> better approach.

I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex CM
of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if you
are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not going
to cut it. They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
that does not currently exist even in the US. Third, the number of Patiots
that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them. Finally, we have
a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS. Sorry, this just does not
look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper tack--don't
try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a chance at
success of sorts.

>
> > (c) Development of
> > a reliable, compact, onboard sensor suite that provides enough
resolution
> to
> > find likely targets, and a darned intelligent software package to handle
> > target discrimination (from background clutter, earlier posited garbage
> > truck, etc.), and can also recognize an entire range of potential
targets
> > and select the one you would want hit from amongst all of them.
>
> If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
weapons,
> you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending
on
> the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
> allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
100%.

I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a success
rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
resources that would have been better used training irregulars and creating
caches of weapons and explosives.

>
> > Sorry, but I
> > don't see ANY potential foes we might face in your near term overcoming
> one,
> > much less all, of those hurdles, and I am sure I have missed a few more.
> [snip]
>
> The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology
has
> progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
> components).

Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the opposition
would be in such a scenario.

Brooks

>
>
>
>

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 08:21:03 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:


>That is a decent description of the selective availability (SA) function of
>GPS. SA renders the average (non-US military) receiver incapable of
>determining a precise fix, and you need precision for the kind of weapons
>the poster was postulating. SA was shut down a couple of years back so that
>civil users (i.e., surveyors, commercial aircraft, etc.) could take
>advantage of its precision (prior to that occuring surveyors had to use what
>is known as "differential GPS", a more time consuming method of achieving a
>precise location), but according to the official USG website on the subject
>it can be reinstituted over a particular region at will.
>
>>
>> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
>> capability, but it would not eliminate it.
>
>Actually, I don't think SA adversely affects US military systems.
>
>Brooks

Processors and computing power are getting cheaper every year - and
there are a lot of US weapons with military GPS around - so it's
conceivable to me that someone could obtain one of these weapons and
reverse-engineer the GPS system on them.

If there is no sort of "auxiliary code input" to the weapon (i.e. some
sort of activation code that has to be input) the reverse engineered
weapons would work just as well as the US weapons, so the US would
have to make the choice of whether it was better for everyone to have
(accurate) GPS or nobody to have GPS.

Without knowing for sure, I would personally expect that current
weapons would have some sort of auxiliary code, and that this code
would have to be entered as part of the target programming process
(which is quite long according to news reports, though it's getting
shorter).

Even without auxiliary codes, the US could still activate the system
at random times. Unless the enemy knew when the US was going to
activate the system, the US might be able to have some "windows of
opportunity" to use their GPS weapons. Of course the enemy might be
able to take advantage of these same windows if they could respond
quickly enough and if they could detect the US launches.

Assuming (as I suspect) that "auxiliary code input" to the weapon is
required, things get more complicated. Basically the question is how
long it would take for the enemy to figure out what the auxiliary code
was to activate their weapons.

One extreme scenario to illustrate the concept - the satellites could
send out random hash until, say, 6:03 am when a major US strike was
planned. At this point, the satellites would start transmitting valid
information according to some specific agreed upon code which the
enemy didn't know in advance. When all US weapons reach their target,
the satellites would go back to sending random hash.

The enemy would have to figure out what the code was in a very short
time period, and program and launch their weapons before the code
expired. This would be extremely difficult.

Pessimistically assuming that the current military GPS system does get
compromised, and that the code breaking process could be done in
minutes, the US is of course free to build a better one with more
modern (and longer) codes. Of course, retrofitting existing weapons
to use the new GPS system might be a bit involved. OTOH, it could be
as simple as pulling out a modular "black box", and replacing it with
a new improved one.

In article >,
Simon Morden > wrote:

> Michael Ash wrote:
>
> > Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
> > will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
> > Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
> > handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
> > that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
> > don't think it would be that effective.
>
> Of course. I 've no idea of your background, but AFAIK suicide terrorism is
> very
> much a minority sport. November 17, IRA, INLA, Bader-Minhoff, and most of the
> worlds' terrorist/ex-terrorist organisations much rather killed their
> 'enemies'
> than themselves. A bombing campaign by a cell is a much better use of human
> resources.

My background isn't much. The closest I've come to any experience in
this area is visiting Israel smack in the middle of the two week
ceasefire they had in June of 2001.

In any case, I fully believe you. My statement was mostly CYA. I don't
think that making everybody be a suicide bomber is terribly effective,
but I don't know enough to rule it out. I do recall thinking, during the
fall of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, that a trained monkey could
probably do a better job of defending that country. Take all of those
army units that got surrounded/wiped out/whatever and simply distribute
them throughout the cities. Give each one a rifle, give RPGs to as many
as you can. Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.

In article >,
Timothy Eisele > wrote:

> In rec.arts.sf.science Michael Ash > wrote:
> > Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
> > will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
> > Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
> > handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
> > that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
> > don't think it would be that effective.
>
> Which is why the ideal complement to this strategy would be the intensive
> development of a really effective brainwashing technology. Once your amoral
> dictatorship has the ability to really deeply convince people on a wholesale
> basis that the regime is worth dying for, then you're in business.
> Especially
> since this will have the useful side benefit of greatly improving your hold
> on power with the general populace, if you can apply similar technology to
> them as well.

Is 'brainwashing technology' somehow not in the same realm of fantasy as
'magic fairy dust'? I was under the impression that it was something you
only found in bad novels and movies.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>> I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
>> attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
>> there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
>> involved in the decision to fire.
>
>That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous combat
>systems.

Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
target.

Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
Exocet anti-ship missile. I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

>because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and hit
>anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the target
>is right at the time the weapon arrives.

What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
missile does this literally :-)).

>Now if you want to send a flock of
>CM's out and about to go on a hunter-killer mission, you have some real
>problems to confront, like: (a) How do you prevent fratricide or targeting
>of the local version of the Sanford garbage truck (remember that not every
>enemy is going to be able to discount collateral damage like the insurgents
>we are no facing in Iraq do)?

You can't prevent fratricide all the time, and most countries would
have a higher tolerance from losses caused by friendly fire than
most western countries do. The missile would know (at least
approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
it is over land occupied by its own side.

Discriminating between military and civilian vehicles is a lot
harder, I agree.

>(b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
>MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
>limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit, but
>which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to most
>potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
>navigation system)

The topographic data would probably be available if the missile is
flying over the territory of its own country.

Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

>or up high where the view is better,

It's possible that a mission might require some of the flight to be
at high level and some at low level. I imagine the missiles could
be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
cable into a slot on the missile.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 09:14:26 +0000, Mike Williams
> wrote:

>Wasn't it phil hunt who wrote:
>
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>
>I think that any middle-ranking country that went up against USA/The
>West using military weapons would get seriously stomped on. The only way
>to have a chance would be to win the propaganda war, turning popular
>opinion in the USA against contesting the war. Infiltrate your
>supporters into the US media many years before war is likely. Be aware
>that the peril of one individual that the US media can identify with is
>worth an awful lot more in propaganda terms than the death of anonymous
>thousands. Design any military actions with their propaganda value as
>the primary consideration, ignoring conventional military value almost
>completely. Employ well-equipped media crews on the ground who
>understand the US media, and have them rapidly release their (edited)
>footage to the guys you've got planted in the US.
>
> "The only way to understand the battle is to understand the language.
> War is as much concept as execution."
>
>Provoke your opponents into making the first media-visible aggressive
>step, and make yourself appear to be implementing passive resistance, or
>using a minimal defensive response. Meanwhile, if you can find any
>targets that are not media-visible (i.e. the US government can't
>publicly admit that the targets exist) then attack them aggressively.

I believe that can work quite well

Killing people and bombing no longer has the same positive impact
as a good media campaign
--
Jim Watt http://www.gibnet.com

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 10:32:11 -0800, pervect > wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 08:21:03 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:
>
>>That is a decent description of the selective availability (SA) function of
>>GPS. SA renders the average (non-US military) receiver incapable of
>>determining a precise fix, and you need precision for the kind of weapons
>>the poster was postulating. SA was shut down a couple of years back so that
>>civil users (i.e., surveyors, commercial aircraft, etc.) could take
>>advantage of its precision (prior to that occuring surveyors had to use what
>>is known as "differential GPS", a more time consuming method of achieving a
>>precise location), but according to the official USG website on the subject
>>it can be reinstituted over a particular region at will.
>>>
>>> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
>>> capability, but it would not eliminate it.
>>
>>Actually, I don't think SA adversely affects US military systems.

No, it doesn't, by design. SA only affects the accuracy of the
GPS satellites' coarse positioning signal. Military GPS receivers
can receive additional signals from the satellites that allow
more precise position determination.

> Processors and computing power are getting cheaper every year - and
> there are a lot of US weapons with military GPS around - so it's
> conceivable to me that someone could obtain one of these weapons and
> reverse-engineer the GPS system on them.
>
> If there is no sort of "auxiliary code input" to the weapon (i.e. some
> sort of activation code that has to be input) the reverse engineered
> weapons would work just as well as the US weapons, so the US would
> have to make the choice of whether it was better for everyone to have
> (accurate) GPS or nobody to have GPS.

The military GPS signal is encrypted. A receiver needs to know
the current encryption key to decrypt the signals and use them
to compute its position, so just duplicating the hardware somehow
won't do you any good.

Encrypting the signal also makes it very difficult for
an enemy to spoof GPS signals -- spoofed signals would have
to be encrypted with the correct key to fool a receiver.

> Without knowing for sure, I would personally expect that current
> weapons would have some sort of auxiliary code, and that this code
> would have to be entered as part of the target programming process
> (which is quite long according to news reports, though it's getting
> shorter).

Encryption key, not "auxiliary code".

I don't know any details of how the keys are distributed, but
I suspect the people who designed the current GPS system thought
a lot about the issue and came up with a solution that is
relatively secure and not terribly inconvenient.

> [...]
>
> One extreme scenario to illustrate the concept - the satellites could
> send out random hash until, say, 6:03 am when a major US strike was
> planned. At this point, the satellites would start transmitting valid
> information according to some specific agreed upon code which the
> enemy didn't know in advance. When all US weapons reach their target,
> the satellites would go back to sending random hash.
>
> The enemy would have to figure out what the code was in a very short
> time period, and program and launch their weapons before the code
> expired. This would be extremely difficult.

See

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/iraq-and-gps_faq.pdf>

for a discussion of these issues. According to the author, the
use of selective availability (SA) to prevent opponents from
using civilian GPS receivers to get accurate position fixes is
a thing of the past:

"The technique the U.S. military developed which allowed them to
switch off SA is selective in-theatre jamming of the SPS signal."

Another poster suggested that SA could be turned on and off on
GPS satellites individually as they overfly the area of conflict --
this is rather unlikely. The orbital altitude of the GPS
constellation is approximately 10,000 miles. This means that
at any given time, a single GPS satellite is above the horizon
and visible to GPS receivers over almost half of the earth's
surface. It would be possible to selectively impose SA on one
hemisphere of the earth at a time, but not in an area much
smaller than that.

To return to the original topic of this thread, I think the
Elbonians would be better off spending money on developing
cheap inertial navigation systems for their hypothetical
low-cost cruise missiles (HLCCMs) than going to any effort to
try to outsmart the U.S. Air Force so they can use GPS.

Inertial navigation systems can't be jammed or spoofed, and
are accurate enough to get HLCCMs within hypothetical low-cost
terminal seeker range of their targets.


ljd

"Pete" > wrote in :

> Instead of trying to build *up* to defeat a western/Nato/US opponent, the
> only possible solution would be to build *down*, and grow self aware,
> mobile, small scale explosives.
>
> A 20 year old with a backpack full of C-4, as is done now.
>
Why send a man to do a boy's job?

"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in message >...
> Incidentally, the other Western countries *are* middle-ranking countries, so
> this is really a "how do we defend against the US" question. Under those
> circumstances I think one simply does not attempt conventional warfare - not
> in the time frame you suggest. You'd lose everything you have. You allow
> yourself to be occupied, then you start making life bad.

Does this mean that any war the US can win without occupying you is a
lost cause?

There are two obvious types of such wars: throwing country A out of
country B (Serbia, Desert Storm), and "We don't particularly care what
replaces government C, but government C is going to be destroyed."
(Afghanistan 2001, maybe if NK decides to nuke us either directly or
via a third party)...

-jake

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>or up high where the view is better, but also where it
>becomes easy meat for the layers of Patriots and Avengers fielded by the
>resident duckhunters, along with any covering Aegis controlled Standards in
>the littoral zone, and the ubiquitous F-15/F-22 CAP?

These missiles might cost abpout $500,000 each whereas the LCCM
might cost $10,000 each. Furthermore none of these missile systems
are perfectly accurate, thus if many missiles are sent, some
would get through.

Also, if a missile is small (imagine there are several models) it
might be hard for radar to pick it out, or it might have a radar
return the same size as a bird's.

>and, (c) Development of
>a reliable, compact, onboard sensor suite that provides enough resolution to
>find likely targets,

You can buy good resolution digital cameras in any good camera shop.

>and a darned intelligent software package to handle
>target discrimination (from background clutter, earlier posited garbage
>truck, etc.),

There are plenty of people outside the USA who can program computers.

> and can also recognize an entire range of potential targets
>and select the one you would want hit from amongst all of them. Sorry, but I
>don't see ANY potential foes we might face in your near term overcoming one,
>much less all, of those hurdles, and I am sure I have missed a few more.

My understanding is the laws of physics work the same for people in
all countries.

>> The second is when the sensor is in one place, and the shooter
>> somewhere else; in those situations, what problems have the USA
>> encountered, and how have they gone about solving them?
>
>Then you have to have a good secure datalink, and as it stands now the only
>folks that are likely to have those during the near-term are us and our good
>friends.

Encryption technology is well-known and software to implement it can
be downloaded from the net. Any competent programmer should be able
to implement this.

>The best currently fielded US system of this nature is the SLAM-ER,
>with ATA--think of an extended range Harpoon with an ability to send its
>sensor images back to either a launch aircraft or another suitable platform,
>and which responds to that platform's commands to acheive retargeting or to
>allow more discriminative targeting. IIRC the new Tactical Tomahawk will
>also offer an inflight retargeting capability. You will note that the
>current trend in the US, which is the undeniable leader ins such
>capabilities, is to retain the man-in-the-loop at present, and that will not
>significantly change during the period you have set forth, so I seriously
>doubt Underwhatsistan is going to be able to do any better.

The only modern technology necessary to make these missiles possible
is computing (both hardware and software). Computing technology is
available to any medium sized nation, and merely asserting that the
USA must be the most advanced is exactly the sort of hubristic
attitude that would help a medium-sized power at war with them.

>> >Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
>> >the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
>> >contractors.
>>
>> Because they are more technologically advanced. Some technologies,
>> for example high performance jet engines, require a large industrial
>> base to make. The sort of technologies I'm talking about are ones
>> that can potentially be produced a lot more cheaply, for example by
>> adapting mass-produced (but nevertheless highly sophisticated)
>> consumer products. Any medium-sized power should be able to produce
>> embedded computer control systems.
>
>If it was that easy, others would be doing so already--they are not.

This is a reasonable argument. Hiowever, people are developing
cruise missiles: According to
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1212>
"There are currently 161 operational UAV programs in 50 countries"

There are probably also a number of secret programs, or programs to
add better sensors/computers to existing UAVs/missiles.

>Heck,
>look at the Storm Shadow ALCM--a good system, but in no way is it verging on
>the system brilliance you envision for this asymetric uber-weapon, and Storm
>Shadow is the best that is offered by our European allies, who are, while
>generally a bit behind the US power curve in this area, light years ahead of
>the rest-of-the-world (possible exception of Israel, but if you take the
>Popeyes we got lynched into buying from them as an example, not too great
>either).

What's thre story with the Popeye?

>Sorm Shadow/Scalp are already enjoying export success because the
>rest of the world can't do a better job on their own--the only way they get
>any capability like what you refer to is by buying from those western
>industries you rather prematurely wrote off.

This is true for now. How long will it be? I predict that within 10
years, many countries will be producing missiles with roughly the
same capabilities as Storm Shadow, but at much less cost.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?

Lets define "middle ranking" and "war" first. India and China are
a far different matter from Pakistan, or SK/NK. Also, what sort of
war are we talking about? A conflict in which the nations governments
survival is at stake, an all out to the death conflit, or something
else?
The first thing you have to consider is that no middle ranking
country could survive an "all out" conflit with the US, which means we
want to avoid tactics that might lead to the conflict transforming
into such a battle. No nukes, bio's, chems, etc. No direct attacks
on the CONUS.


>
>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>made cheaply.
>

For china, maybe. Pakistan or Iran or India? less likely. Even
LCCM's are fairly high technology, and 'dead reckoning' isn't as easy
as it sounds. You can't use GPS, because the first thing the U.S.
will do is shut down that ability-- which means some form of inertial
guidence.


>LCCMs could be designed to attack enemy vehicles, both armoured, and
>supply columns. The missile could use dead-reckoning to move itself
>approximately where the enemy vehicles are, then use visual sensors
>to detect vehicles (moving ones would probably be easier to detect).
>This would require digital cameras and computers in the guidance
>system, both of which are cheap. Programming appropriate image
>recognition software is non-trivial, but has been done, and the cost
>could be spread over large production runs. As the LCCM sees a
>vehicle and chooses a target, it could dive towards it, and
>simultaneously broadcast its position and a photo of the target
>(useful intel for the missile controllers).

Cheap digistal cameras would be very easy to spoof-- smoke comes
to mind, and if you start going for IR systems, you've just stopped
being "cheap". Also, computer's and programs that can pick out
targets against ground clutter are somewhat more difficult-- note the
fact that even now the U.S. still prefers laser guided missiles, and I
don't believe we have any autonomous weapons like this in stock
(although some are being made ready). The problems are tremendous.


>
>Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
>difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
>vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
>easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
>bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
>could be used).

More doable-- but if it isn't an active system, well the ocean is a
very big place. If it is, then it's either expensive, or very easy to
spoof.
As for a swarm, how to you choose targets? If there isn't any
inter-communiation, your entire swarm will attack the first ship it
sees...which usually won't be a major target. If there is inter-UAV
communication, you're back to having a very expensive system that even
the U.S. hasn't quite figured out, and is far beyhond the capabiliies
of most other nations.

>
>Another application would be to make it re-usable, i.e. a UAV rather
>than a CM. Mount a machine gun in it, and let it roam around over
>the battlefield taking pot-shots at anything that moves. Or use it
>to give targetting data for artillery.
>

Targeting data maybe-- many nations have that. An Autonomous UCAV?
Nope-- for one thing, consider how difficult it woudl be to insure it
doesn't fire on your own units. IFF systems for autonomous UCAV's are
one of the big design blocks.


>Western nations can, and are, using UAVs extensively, for these
>sorts of roles. However, western defence industries tend to be
>slow-moving, bloated, produce expensive kit, and it would probably
>be possible for a mid-range power, provided it adopts a
>minimum-bureaucracy approach to design, to produce weapon systems
>faster and more cheaply. Faster weapon system design mewans it could
>"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
>by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
>weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.


The problems is that these weapons wouldn't be "low cost" for other
nations-- they'd be major projects, taking forever because most
mid-range nations that migbht be in conflict with the West don't have
the vast depth of technical expertese we do.
One example-- low cost bombs using GPS and inertial guidence were
developed and fielded by the U.S.-- while the system itself is "low
cost" the effort to develop it is anything but. Low cost loitering
UAV's and cruise missiles are in development-- in the U.S. and UK. I
think maybe China and India might be able to conduct a design effort
like you sugggest, but it woudl be hard for them, and I can't see
other nations, like Pakistan, any African nations, or even smaller
western nations like Austraila, Canada, or Italy being able to even
come close.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 17:55:13 GMT, Dionysios Pilarinos > wrote:
>
>I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy.

Harpy is an anti-radar weapon; I wasn't specifically thinking of
that sort of weapon, but in general its one of the things I had in
mind: something that can loiter looking for targets.

I'm thinking of a whole family of cruise missiles, with different
sizes (and therefore ranges and payloads). There would be different
sensors as well, buth I expect they would all include digital
cameras and associated image processing software.

> It
>is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
>significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and even
>there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing or
>procuring).
>
>The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors (TV,
>IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on some
>signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at not
>killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).

This is mostly a software problem. There are programmers in all
middle-ranking countries. All of the ones I listed (in my other
post) have plenty of programmers.

>Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking about
>a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
>anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively) overwhelmed.
>Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
>better approach.

Countering sensors on the cruise missile might be difficult. Lasers
might work.

>If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive weapons,
>you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending on
>the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
>allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below 100%.

If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
procurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
100,000 missiles.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>years?
>

Concentrate on training and developing a professional officers
corps. No matter the technology if your soldiers are uneducated
draftees who don't want ot be there, and your officers were chosen
for: "Who paid the highest bribe" or "who is least likely to be able
to carry off a coup", you'll get your butt kicked.

Wasn't it pervect who wrote:
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
>hunt) wrote:
>
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>>
>>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>>made cheaply.
>
>How are you getting your position information?
>
>The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
>control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
>US, you can't count on your GPS working right.

The last I heard, the projected date for the launch of the Galileo Next
Generation Global Navigation Satellite System was some time in 2005, so
after that date there could be an alternative to the American GPS.
However, anyone who's at war with the US is likely to be also disliked
by the Europeans behind Galileo, and might find that they can't get good
readings from either system.

--
Mike Williams
Gentleman of Leisure

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 18:22:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>> I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy. It
>> is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
>> significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and even
>> there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing or
>> procuring).
>>
>> The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
>> (TV,
>> IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
>> some
>> signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
>> not
>> killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).
>
>And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
>dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some second/third
>world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the next
>ten years? I don't.

The problems listed above are information-processing problems, that
is, software problems. Does it really require billions of dollars to
solve these problems? I say no: a few small groups of really
competent programms can be many times more productive than how
software is traditionally written. I've worked as a programmer for
defense contractors (and for other large organisations), and believe
me, there is a *lot* of waste and inefficiency. If the software was
written right, it could probably be done with several orders of
magnitude more efficiency.

>Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
>their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
>going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
>radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be placed
>in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
>FM radios is not going to work).

Most ground vehicles radiate visible lightr, at least during
daytime. At light they radiate IR, which can bre picked up with
similar sensors.

>I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex CM
>of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if you
>are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
>things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not going
>to cut it.

Wrong. The complexity is in the *software*. CM hardware can be --
and historically has been -- put together by unskilled slave labour
in squalid conditions.

>They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,

Yes. But once software has been written once (and we're talking
millions not billions of dollars) it can be duplicated at zero cost.

>since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
>that does not currently exist even in the US. Third, the number of Patiots
>that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
>missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
>mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.

Do you have actual numbers here?

> Finally, we have
>a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
>and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.

It would be quite easy for an attack by lots of cruise missiles to
overload the defences at a point.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 06:33:33 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr. > wrote:
>
>> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
>> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
>> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
>> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
>> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
>> could be used).
>
>While 'swarming' ships with cruise missiles could possibly overwhelm their
>anti-missile systems, it is still not a feasible plan for an effective
>weapon system. Think about it; how many missiles would be needed to get
>through the anti-missile defenses and still cause major damage? 75? 100?
>More? Per ship? Where are all of these missiles going to be set up and
>launched from, and how are you going to keep them from being destroyed by a
>B-2 in the first 10 seconds of the war?

Why would all the missiles have to be launched from the same
location?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

Michael Ash wrote:

> I do recall thinking, during the
> fall of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, that a trained monkey could
> probably do a better job of defending that country. Take all of those
> army units that got surrounded/wiped out/whatever and simply distribute
> them throughout the cities. Give each one a rifle, give RPGs to as many
> as you can. Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
> Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
> busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
> put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.

I concur. If the Iraqis had been as determined as say, the Soviets in defense of
Leningrad and Stalingrad, the choices would have been between bomb Baghdad flat or
suffer massive casualties.

Thank God they weren't.

Indeed, the general level of competence of most terrorist/armed resistance
movements is worryingly low. Where do these guys get their training? (I know the
answer is the CIA, but I'll just ask nursie for more thorazine rather than go down
that road...)

Simon Morden
--
__________________________________________________ ______
Visit the Book of Morden at http://www.bookofmorden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk
*Thy Kingdom Come - a brief history of Armageddon* out now from Lone Wolf

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 00:04:21 -0800, pervect > wrote:
>
>How are you getting your position information?

A combination of dead reckoning, a ground-based LORAN-type system,
celestial navigation, and visual/IR identification of the target in
the end phase.

>The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
>control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
>US, you can't count on your GPS working right.

Indeed.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 10:32:11 -0800, pervect > wrote:
>
>Processors and computing power are getting cheaper every year - and
>there are a lot of US weapons with military GPS around - so it's
>conceivable to me that someone could obtain one of these weapons and
>reverse-engineer the GPS system on them.
>
>If there is no sort of "auxiliary code input" to the weapon (i.e. some
>sort of activation code that has to be input)

I would imagine there is and the USA has the ability to change the
codes from time to time. I would be very surprised if this is not
the case.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 09:14:26 +0000, Mike Williams > wrote:
>Wasn't it phil hunt who wrote:
>
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>
>I think that any middle-ranking country that went up against USA/The
>West using military weapons would get seriously stomped on.

I doubt if any country would attack the USA, though many would want
to deter a US attack.

>The only way
>to have a chance would be to win the propaganda war, turning popular
>opinion in the USA against contesting the war.

Indeed propaganda is important, but a bit outside what I've been
discussing.

>Provoke your opponents into making the first media-visible aggressive
>step, and make yourself appear to be implementing passive resistance, or
>using a minimal defensive response. Meanwhile, if you can find any
>targets that are not media-visible (i.e. the US government can't
>publicly admit that the targets exist) then attack them aggressively.

That's clever, I hadn't thought of that.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 13:09:48 +0100, Michael Ash > wrote:
>
>Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
>will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
>Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
>handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
>that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
>don't think it would be that effective.

Indeed. Developing and caching weapons that allow people to be
guerrillas with reduced risk to themselves (such as time-delayed
mortars) would seem an obvious thing to do.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
.. .
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks >
wrote:
> >
> >> I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
> >> attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
> >> there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
> >> involved in the decision to fire.
> >
> >That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous
combat
> >systems.
>
> Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
> written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
> picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
> target.

"The programming for this isn't particularly hard"? Gee, one wonders why
only one nation has to date fielded a system that even verges on that kind
of capability. And as to it being "just a matter of aiming the missile
towards the target..." uhhhh...yeeeah, if you consider "just" including
developing a navigational system that also supports its own survivability
(i.e., is able to negotiate a route to the target down in the weeds),
knowing where the target is in the first place and getting that data to the
firing point realtime, and provided that you target just happens to match up
with what is loaded in the missiles brain (Missile: "I am looking for a
tank...tank..tank..." as it flies across twenty light skinned trucks loaded
with dismounts). You are REALLY lowballing the estimate of how much R&D is
required to field such a semi-autonomous weapon. Ever wonder why you are
just now seeing such technology emerging in the US military (and hint--it
ain't because of our "bloated" defense industry)?

>
> Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
> Exocet anti-ship missile. I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
> with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

For gosh sakes, you are comparing apples and oranges. Exocet was fired at a
known target location, and one which could not be mistaken for something
else short of a freakin' iceberg, and during final approach locks in with
its own guidance radar, operating against a background remarkably free of
clutter. And besides, you are making a point against your earlier
premise--if Exocet was so easy to develop and manufacture, even given the
comparitive ease of its mission when contrasted to a system that has to
find, identify, and attack various DIFFERENT kinds of targets with different
signatures in the terrestrial realm as you have posited, then why have only
a handful of nations been able to develop their own anti-ship missiles?

>
> >because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and
hit
> >anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the
target
> >is right at the time the weapon arrives.
>
> What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
> to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
> missile does this literally :-)).

There is one heck of a difference between ARM's that home on active threat
emitters, or follow the last plotted course as HARM does, and these
uber-CM's you have posited that can find and strike various kinds of (very
passive)targets.

>
> >Now if you want to send a flock of
> >CM's out and about to go on a hunter-killer mission, you have some real
> >problems to confront, like: (a) How do you prevent fratricide or
targeting
> >of the local version of the Sanford garbage truck (remember that not
every
> >enemy is going to be able to discount collateral damage like the
insurgents
> >we are no facing in Iraq do)?
>
> You can't prevent fratricide all the time, and most countries would
> have a higher tolerance from losses caused by friendly fire than
> most western countries do. The missile would know (at least
> approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
> it is over land occupied by its own side.

LOL! If it only knows "within a few km or so" where it is, then news
flash--you won't even be able to use that puppy against a CVN. Your
postulated
brilliant-CM-on-a-shoestring-budget-able-to-be-manufactured-by-anyone is
sounding more and more ludicrous.

>
> Discriminating between military and civilian vehicles is a lot
> harder, I agree.
>
> >(b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
> >MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
> >limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit,
but
> >which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to
most
> >potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
> >navigation system)
>
> The topographic data would probably be available if the missile is
> flying over the territory of its own country.

You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
compact enough to fit in your missile, and is capable of extremely rapid
computational work, not to mention is able to manage a massive starting data
set (when we did a relatively simple 3-D mapping effort of our 70+ square
mile town a few years back it was going to take something like
half-a-gig)--ever consider what your missile is going to have to deal with
if it is going to have any kind of range at all?

>
> Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
> celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up. Automated
celestial tracking/guidance is not the purview of the amateur, and I doubt
you would get the requisite accuracy from such a system mounted on such a
small platform. DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and say, "Gee, that was
tough--time for a beer!"

>
> >or up high where the view is better,
>
> It's possible that a mission might require some of the flight to be
> at high level and some at low level. I imagine the missiles could
> be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
> cable into a slot on the missile.

It pops up, it becomes Patriot bait. It stays low, the Avengers eat it. The
CAP fighters can munch on either, but they will more than likely just remain
occupied with frying each launch system as it unmasks.

You are getting quite far off base with this if your objective is to find an
asymetric attack method; what you are postulating plays to the US strengths,
and that is the opposite of asymetric warfare. take the advice of the others
who have already suggested the low tech approach--when you try to out-tech
the US, you will lose.

Brooks

>
> --

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 17:52:28 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>
>The most sensible strategy is not to get involved in such a war to
>start with.

Indeed; but sometimes war is unavoidable.

>>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>>made cheaply.
>
>Guidance systems depend on *much* more than simply their computers.
>You also need the inertial components, or their analogs, and *those*
>are going to be hard to obtain in large quantities, especially at any
>useful accuracy level.

digital cameras can do much of the job, and they are available
cheaply.

><snipped various fanciful uses>
>Many of these depend on the West not deploying something it's
>exceedingly capable at; Electronic warfare and countermeasures.

What electronic countermeasures could be used?

>>Faster weapon system design mewans it could
>>"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
>>by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
>>weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.
>
>Problem is, the Western powers can get inside this curve faster than
>the medium nation can. The factories, power grid, etc of the medium
>nation can be taken out within a few weeks to months via manned
>bombers, or our own cruise missiles. Vital components produced
>overseas can be stopped via blockade.

That's after the war breaks out. The USA isn't likely to start
bombing every country with an arms industry, is it?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 18:22:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks >
wrote:
> >
<snip>

> >since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
> >that does not currently exist even in the US. Third, the number of
Patiots
> >that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
> >missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
> >mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.
>
> Do you have actual numbers here?

Six firing batteries per Patriot battalion, with eight launchers per
battery, equals 48 launchers per battalion. Each launcher has 4 rounds
onboard, so you are talking 192 missiles loaded out and ready to fire--not
sure what the ABL is, but safely assume at least two rounds per tube in the
battery/BN trains structure, so we are looking at what, another 384 rounds
readily available? So total Pats equals about 576 rounds for a single
battalion? Then you have the Avengers, with 36 Avengers in each corps level
ADA Avenger battalion, each with 8 tubes uploaded, so just taking into
account their initial upload you are talking 288 missiles without bothering
to consider their ABL in the trains. But that's not all, folks--each
division has its own ADA battalion, with another 24 Avengers, 24 BSF-V's,
and 40 MANPADS (or a heavy division), so again minus the ammo in the trains,
you have another 328 Stingers there. So your nominal corps force is going to
have somewhere in the neighborhood of beween 576 and 1,100 Patriots covering
it, another thousand plus Stingers (conservative estimate). Are you
beginning to understand why trying to out-tech the US is an unwise move if
you are really interested in asymetric warfare?

Brooks

ISTM that there are two possible objectives:

1) deterring the large power from starting a war

2) minimizing the damage a war does to the citizens

Countries involved in terrorist-risistance campaigns tend to be
unpleasant places to live. Resistance campaigns at home may have
some outcome influencing effect (Nam was sold to the American
publicv that way), but attacks on the larger country seem
counter-productive as Afghanistan and Chechnya (Sp?) are
discovering. Possibly non-terrorist strategies aimed at attacking
the big country at home would back-fire simillarly.

Probably some combination of being a tough nut to crack, giving
up something the aggressor wants and persuading others that their
interests are served by helping out is the winning strategy.

Two countries faced with large, belligerent neighbours in the
thirties were Poland and Finland. Neither neighbour could be
bought off. The latter did rather well, the former poorly. Are
there lessons in their experience?

Peter Skelton

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

>Then one wonders why those very same nations usually end up trying to buy
>the products produced by those "slow-moving, bloated" western defense
>contractors.

Mainly because creating and maintaining a national defense industry is
very hard and very expensive. Doing the same but ensuring that it
keeps up with the state-of-the-art is even more so.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
>c) Development of
>a reliable, compact, onboard sensor suite that provides enough resolution to
>find likely targets, and a darned intelligent software package to handle
>target discrimination (from background clutter, earlier posited garbage
>truck, etc.), and can also recognize an entire range of potential targets
>and select the one you would want hit from amongst all of them. Sorry, but I
>don't see ANY potential foes we might face in your near term overcoming one,
>much less all, of those hurdles, and I am sure I have missed a few more.

There's also the problem of ensuring that your swarm of missiles sent
against a swarm of targets don't all choose the same, or a small set
of targets. Non trivial at best, nightmarish at worst, and one that
the 'high tech' nations have all looked at, and declined to solve,
choosing instead other solutions.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:
>The problems listed above are information-processing problems, that
>is, software problems. Does it really require billions of dollars to
>solve these problems? I say no: a few small groups of really
>competent programms can be many times more productive than how
>software is traditionally written.

The issue isn't programmers Phil. The issue the massive amounts of
R&D to develop the information needed to specify the sensor that the
programmers will process the output of. The issue is the massive
amount of R&D needed to develop the algorithms the programmers will
implement to analyze the output of the sensor. The issue is the
thousands of hours of R&D needed to develop the database that the
software will use to compare the output of the sensor with...

Writing the software is but one small piece (howsoever important) of a
much larger and more complex effort.

>I've worked as a programmer for defense contractors (and for other large
>organisations), and believe me, there is a *lot* of waste and inefficiency.
>if the software was written right, it could probably be done with several orders
>of magnitude more efficiency.

You could have the tightest, fastest, most efficient analysis code in
the world... But it's all meaningless without the other things that go
into making a targeting system. What you have is the typical myopia
of the programmer.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
>procurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
>typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
>100,000 missiles.

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to train
the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute them
when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of themselves.
(And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>>That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous combat
>>systems.
>
>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>picture.

Falling off a cliff isn't a problem once you've learned how to fly like
Superman.

Trouble is, that prerequisite is harder than you might expect.

Getting a machine to tell a T-72 from a M1A1 from a Leclerc is hard
enough in good conditions: doing so in the presence of camouflage,
obscurants and when the crew have run out of internal stowage (so have
hung lots of external gear) and maybe stored some spare track plates on
the glacis front ('cause they need the spare plates and they might as
well be extra armour) gets _really_ tricky. Do you err on the side of
"tank-like vehicle, kill!" or "if you're not sure don't attack"?

Would it not be embarrasing to have a successful armoured raid broken up
by your own missiles?

>It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>target.

Which presupposes you know where the target is, even roughly, in a
sufficiently timely manner.

>Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
>Exocet anti-ship missile.

Which never once hit its intended target from an air launch (five
launches, all aimed at 'carriers'; two hits, one on a picket ship and
one on a STUFT that was seduced off another picket)

Bad example. (Besides, Exocet in 1982 was a frontline Western
capability, launched from aircraft with radar that could cover the
missile's range window... and they _still_ missed their intended
targets. You're talking about Hail Mary shots of extended-ranged Exocets
from the Argentine mainland... really not likely to work)

>I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
>with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

Key problem is that going up against the US loses you your comms and
observation (in oldspeak) or your C4ISTAR (in newspeak). Can't get recce
flights out to see where they are, can't get communication with your
forward observers, can't orbit surveillance assets. Observe how
thoroughly Iraq was deceived in 1991, for instance, or how Argentina
spent most of the Falklands conflict trying to figure out where the
British forces were and what they were doing. (Even when they had a
perfect target, they hit escorts rather than HVUs)

>>because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and hit
>>anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the target
>>is right at the time the weapon arrives.
>
>What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
>to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
>missile does this literally :-)).

Which area are you firing it at? Seeker windows are small and
battlefields are large. The larger the area it's expected to scan, the
harder it is to build and the less reliable it will be.

>>(b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
>>MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
>>limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit, but
>>which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to most
>>potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
>>navigation system)
>
>The topographic data would probably be available if the missile is
>flying over the territory of its own country.
>
>Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
>celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

DR is patchy at best unless you've got good inertial guidance systems
(non-trivial). Celestial only works on clear nights - so you're limited
to fighting wars after dark on cloudless nights with no flares in the
sky. LORAN is a radio broadcast and therefore not survivable against a
US-style opponent.

>>or up high where the view is better,
>
>It's possible that a mission might require some of the flight to be
>at high level and some at low level. I imagine the missiles could
>be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
>cable into a slot on the missile.

This has only been done for twenty years or so in the West, so hardly a
great advance.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

(phil hunt) wrote:
>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>target.

ROTFL. Yes, once you master the extraordinarily difficult task of
writing software to identify a target, then pretty much else is
simple. But you appear to be underestimating the effort needed to
write that software. (Clue: All of your high tech nations have been
wrestling with the problem for years, with little real sucess.)

>Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
>Exocet anti-ship missile. I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
>with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

The Excocet relies on active detection of the target, not on analysis
of passive images of the target.

>What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
>to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
>missile does this literally :-)).

ALARM, like *ALL* ARM's, depends on *active emissions* by the target,
not on analysis of passive images of the target.

>You can't prevent fratricide all the time, and most countries would
>have a higher tolerance from losses caused by friendly fire than
>most western countries do. The missile would know (at least
>approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
>it is over land occupied by its own side.

Assuming the firing unit has a valid picture of what land is and is
not currently in friendly hands. A problem that 'high tech' nations
are finding difficult to solve.

>Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
>celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

One suspects you vastly underestimate the difficulties involved in
accurate navigation.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
>> Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
>> celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.
>
>Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up.

Depending on LORAN plays to one of the great strengths of the US...
Electronic warfare. (Not to mention various more violent ways of
taking the system off the air.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

Bernardz > wrote:
>Say I built heaps of multiple-rocket launchers built an improved WW2, V1
>jet to hit a city say at 200 miles and then targeted them at an US ally
>cities.
>
>Aiming would be pretty trivial, most modern cities are pretty big anyway
>and so what if a a lot miss? Its not like they cost me much anyway each
>missile.

Aiming them is trivial. Producing them, storing them until needed,
deploying them when needed, and launching them in a coordinated
fashion *isn't*. (And all the steps in the process are vulnerable to
disruption.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>Indeed. Developing and caching weapons that allow people to be
>guerrillas with reduced risk to themselves (such as time-delayed
>mortars) would seem an obvious thing to do.

Done thirty years ago with assorted single launchers (basically just a
rail and a stand) to point a 107mm or 122mm rocket targetwards, and a
countdown timer to fire it minutes or hours after the guerilla has
departed.

If you're lucky then you can plant it on the hospital roof, across the
street from the orphanage and next door to the elementary school, and
tip off the news crews so that any enemy counterbattery fire is widely
reported.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

(phil hunt) wrote:
>
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 17:52:28 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
>
(phil hunt) wrote:
>
>>Guidance systems depend on *much* more than simply their computers.
>>You also need the inertial components, or their analogs, and *those*
>>are going to be hard to obtain in large quantities, especially at any
>>useful accuracy level.
>
>digital cameras can do much of the job, and they are available
>cheaply.

ROTFLMAO. A commercial digital camera isn't within an order of
magnitude of defense imaging systems and *isn't* a replacement for
inertial components. (I.E. a camera can image a target, it cannot
keep your missile level, or on a proper course.)

>><snipped various fanciful uses>
>>Many of these depend on the West not deploying something it's
>>exceedingly capable at; Electronic warfare and countermeasures.
>
>What electronic countermeasures could be used?

Any number of the the systems that the US has developed, especially
for naval and aviation uses.

>>>Faster weapon system design mewans it could
>>>"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
>>>by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
>>>weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.
>>
>>Problem is, the Western powers can get inside this curve faster than
>>the medium nation can. The factories, power grid, etc of the medium
>>nation can be taken out within a few weeks to months via manned
>>bombers, or our own cruise missiles. Vital components produced
>>overseas can be stopped via blockade.
>
>That's after the war breaks out. The USA isn't likely to start
>bombing every country with an arms industry, is it?

No. But bombing after war breaks out is about 99% as efficient as
doing so before the war breaks out. Your LCCM's have to be stored
somewhere, and then deployed to their firing points.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

An interesting if, but the Soviets, though at an apparent disadvantage,
weren't faced with such overwhelming military power, and had a history of
successfully repelling invaders. It would have been tough to motivate the
Iraqis to such determination given that they knew their opponents were
vastly superior based on the clear demostrated in the Kuwait war. And I get
the impression the average Iraqi was even less loyal to the Iraqi government
than the Russians were to theirs. Finally, I would imagine the Soviets were
even more ruthless in there methods for enforcing behavior.

Jarg

"Simon Morden" > wrote in message
...
> Michael Ash wrote:
>
> > I do recall thinking, during the
> > fall of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, that a trained monkey could
> > probably do a better job of defending that country. Take all of those
> > army units that got surrounded/wiped out/whatever and simply distribute
> > them throughout the cities. Give each one a rifle, give RPGs to as many
> > as you can. Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
> > Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
> > busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
> > put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.
>
> I concur. If the Iraqis had been as determined as say, the Soviets in
defense of
> Leningrad and Stalingrad, the choices would have been between bomb Baghdad
flat or
> suffer massive casualties.
>
> Thank God they weren't.
>
> Indeed, the general level of competence of most terrorist/armed resistance
> movements is worryingly low. Where do these guys get their training? (I
know the
> answer is the CIA, but I'll just ask nursie for more thorazine rather than
go down
> that road...)
>
> Simon Morden
> --
> __________________________________________________ ______
> Visit the Book of Morden at http://www.bookofmorden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk
> *Thy Kingdom Come - a brief history of Armageddon* out now from Lone Wolf
>
>

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
. ..
> > I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy.
It
> > is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
> > significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and
even
> > there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing
or
> > procuring).
> >
> > The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
> (TV,
> > IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
> some
> > signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
> not
> > killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).
>
> And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
> dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some
second/third
> world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the
next
> ten years? I don't.

The US has a number of programs all employing various degrees of
technological innovation. While money has been allocated into the research
of new UAV/UCAV's, obviously that is a relatively small investment (when
compared to the total budget). Even with those programs, human involvement
seems to be essential in the operation of the system and targeting of the
enemy. Obviously the program selection, funding, and priority given differs
from country to country. I'm just stating that another country could take a
position on this matter that might differ from that of the US.

> > That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process
> that
> > goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
> > systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
weapon
> > autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.
>
> Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
> their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
> going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
> radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
placed
> in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
> FM radios is not going to work).

There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced sensor
will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.) while
"loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different sensors
can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for fusing
such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

> > Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
> about
> > a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
> > anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
> overwhelmed.
> > Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
> > better approach.
>
> I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex
CM
> of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if
you
> are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
> things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
going
> to cut it.

A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion that
few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.

For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the cost
has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is not
considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery of 3
can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

> They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
> since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
> that does not currently exist even in the US.

But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40 km
away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles). Why
not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a UAV
(like the one used against radar transmissions)?

> Third, the number of Patiots
> that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
> missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
> mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.

How many Patriots are used against incoming artillery shells? Imagine that
instead of artillery shells you have hundreds of self-guided UAV's. Even
against a Harpy battery (54 incoming vehicles that will loiter until they
detonate), what exactly can a Patriot battery do? Now imagine a few hundred
more, some targeting AD and others armored vehicles or ships.

> Finally, we have
> a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
> and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.

Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost in
the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've never
heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

> Sorry, this just does not
> look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper tack--don't
> try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
> unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a chance
at
> success of sorts.

I'm not trying to get into the mind of every despot in the world. However,
many of them invest time and money on conventional programs (like ballistic
missiles). Compared to a ballistic missile system, wouldn't a sensor-fused
CM be a better investment?

> > If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
> weapons,
> > you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending
> on
> > the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
> > allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
> 100%.
>
> I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a success
> rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
> resources that would have been better used training irregulars and
creating
> caches of weapons and explosives.

Irregulars are not going to stop the advance of any regular army (their
mission is quite different). What the army of a country needs to do is to
target the enemy formations. As was proved once again in Iraq, it is
suicidal to stand up against a better equipped and trained military in order
to fight a "conventional" war. The speed, accuracy and lethality ( the
"punch") cannot be countered with 1960's defensive technology. You can
however try to expose any weakness that might exist in the defenses of your
superior opponent (much like the Iraqi irregulars tried doing).

> > The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology
> has
> > progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
> > components).
>
> Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
> emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
> disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the
opposition
> would be in such a scenario.

How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic position
of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they could
send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away (using
SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would have
something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not last
for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's away
were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is remember
the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

> Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
. ..
> > I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy.
It
> > is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
> > significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and
even
> > there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing
or
> > procuring).
> >
> > The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
> (TV,
> > IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
> some
> > signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
> not
> > killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).
>
> And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
> dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some
second/third
> world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the
next
> ten years? I don't.

The US has a number of programs all employing various degrees of
technological innovation. While money has been allocated into the research
of new UAV/UCAV's, obviously that is a relatively small investment (when
compared to the total budget). Even with those programs, human involvement
seems to be essential in the operation of the system and targeting of the
enemy. Obviously the program selection, funding, and priority given differs
from country to country. I'm just stating that another country could take a
position on this matter that might differ from that of the US.

> > That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process
> that
> > goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
> > systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
weapon
> > autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.
>
> Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
> their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
> going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
> radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
placed
> in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
> FM radios is not going to work).

There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced sensor
will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.) while
"loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different sensors
can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for fusing
such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

> > Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
> about
> > a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
> > anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
> overwhelmed.
> > Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
> > better approach.
>
> I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex
CM
> of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if
you
> are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
> things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
going
> to cut it.

A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion that
few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.

For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the cost
has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is not
considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery of 3
can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

> They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
> since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
> that does not currently exist even in the US.

But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40 km
away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles). Why
not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a UAV
(like the one used against radar transmissions)?

> Third, the number of Patiots
> that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
> missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
> mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.

How many Patriots are used against incoming artillery shells? Imagine that
instead of artillery shells you have hundreds of self-guided UAV's. Even
against a Harpy battery (54 incoming vehicles that will loiter until they
detonate), what exactly can a Patriot battery do? Now imagine a few hundred
more, some targeting AD and others armored vehicles or ships.

> Finally, we have
> a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
> and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.

Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost in
the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've never
heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

> Sorry, this just does not
> look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper tack--don't
> try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
> unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a chance
at
> success of sorts.

I'm not trying to get into the mind of every despot in the world. However,
many of them invest time and money on conventional programs (like ballistic
missiles). Compared to a ballistic missile system, wouldn't a sensor-fused
CM be a better investment?

> > If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
> weapons,
> > you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending
> on
> > the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
> > allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
> 100%.
>
> I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a success
> rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
> resources that would have been better used training irregulars and
creating
> caches of weapons and explosives.

Irregulars are not going to stop the advance of any regular army (their
mission is quite different). What the army of a country needs to do is to
target the enemy formations. As was proved once again in Iraq, it is
suicidal to stand up against a better equipped and trained military in order
to fight a "conventional" war. The speed, accuracy and lethality ( the
"punch") cannot be countered with 1960's defensive technology. You can
however try to expose any weakness that might exist in the defenses of your
superior opponent (much like the Iraqi irregulars tried doing).

> > The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology
> has
> > progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
> > components).
>
> Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
> emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
> disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the
opposition
> would be in such a scenario.

How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic position
of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they could
send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away (using
SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would have
something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not last
for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's away
were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is remember
the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

> Brooks

(Derek Lyons) wrote:

> Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to
> train the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute
> them when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of
> themselves. (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
but logistics is what wins wars.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Dionysios Pilarinos" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> . ..
[snip]
> > > That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought
process
> > that
> > > goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt,
etc.) -
> > > systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
> weapon
> > > autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.
> >
> > Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting
location in
> > their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference
from
> > going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or
not
> > radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
> placed
> > in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from
vehicle
> > FM radios is not going to work).
>
> There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced
sensor
> will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.)
while
> "loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different
sensors
> can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
> 155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for
fusing
> such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

The question you should be asking is just who are these people who have
these sensors, the software, and the associated hardware to build such
weapons? Certainly the Russians and Europeans could do such weapons,
China, India, Israel, South Africa, and at a stretch perhaps some South
American nations 'might' be capable of attempting such weapons. Being
capable of attempting such a project does not imply success nor does it
account for changes in behavior of the major powers (read U.S.) As to
being a decade away, ask the Indians about how easy it is to develop
cruise missiles, fighters or ships. They are credible, who else is?

> > > Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed
talking
> > about
> > > a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and
other
> > > anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
> > overwhelmed.
> > > Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might
be a
> > > better approach.
> >
> > I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty
complex
> CM
> > of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point,
if
> you
> > are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that
these
> > things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
> going
> > to cut it.
>
> A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
> human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion
that
> few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.
>
> For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the
cost
> has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is
not
> considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
> truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery
of 3
> can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

A presumption you make is that the Patriot is the weapon of choice. It
may be, then again perhaps a van with lot's of generators and an array of
antennae might be the counter measure. Perhaps the counter to the Harpies
are some alternative sensor fuzed shell. Maybe, a newer missile (Patriot
light if you will) that is much 'dumber' and lower performing hence can be
fired in greater numbers is the answer. Your proposition makes sense if
you assume your target (the U.S.) stands still. It doesn't.

> > They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
> > since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack
system
> > that does not currently exist even in the US.
>
> But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40
km
> away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles).
Why
> not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a
UAV
> (like the one used against radar transmissions)?

Name the nations producing sensor fuzed munitions. Certainly the list of
nations capable of 'developing' them may be large. But I must reiterate
that deciding to develop a munition is not the same as fielding it.

[snip --- about use of AA missiles and MANPADS against UAV's and the like]

> Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
> been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost
in
> the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've
never
> heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

Perhaps, it is largely because UAV's are NOT usually flying low and slow;
we do not always know what and how many such UAV's are shot down and
because for the U.S. at least it has not been a problem that needed
solving.

Just who has used these UAV's against the U.S. and how do you know they
did not get rendered ineffective (jammed, shot down, performance degraded,
control van attacked, etc.)

For what it's worth, U.S. UAV's have been acknowleged to have been shot
down in Iraq and Afghanistan, they probably were shot down in former
Yugoslavia, the Israeli's have probably lost quite a few over Syria and
Lebanon and the Indians and Pakistanians regularly lose UAV's. In my
opinion they do not represent a golden BB, they are simply another tool.

[snip]

> How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic
position
> of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they
could
> send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away
(using
> SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would
have
> something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not
last
> for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's
away
> were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is
remember
> the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

It was difficult enough that in GW1 Iraqi's regularly had difficulty
accurately hitting U.S. forces when they did shoot. Easy enough that
though a few SCUDS and their ilk have caused damage, they really haven't
been an effective military weapon except in those cases where they forced
attrition through diverted forces due to political realities (i.e. keep
Israel out of the war.)

If it were easy to hit troops with self-targeting systems don't you think
the U.S. would be doing it already?

---
In principle, yes, such weapons could be developed. That doesn't mean
however that any given country has all the bits and pieces, be it
software, hardware, experience or otherwise. Also the counter to an
asymmetric weapon can easily be just as assymetric.

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?

One word: Surrender

"tscottme" > wrote in message
...
> phil hunt > wrote in message
> . ..
>
> >
> > Crewed by Alien Space Bats, presumably?
> >
>
> European or African alien space bats?

What is the flight speed of an unladen African alien space bat?

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "raymond o'hara" > wrote in message
> news:KM9Eb.580420$Tr4.1558044@attbi_s03...
> >
>
> >
> > cheap dirty nukes . if you got 'em use 'em
> >
> >
>
> At which point your entire country becomes a glowing plain
> of radioactive glass.
>
> Great strategy there but dont give up the day job.

It's amazing how many people have forgotten about all the ICBMs that are
still laying around. I don't want to find out what it would take to
provoke the powers-that-be to actually unleash them.

Of course, maybe just one would have the desired effect.



Ray Drouillard

"Derek Lyons" > wrote in message
...
> Bernardz > wrote:
> >Say I built heaps of multiple-rocket launchers built an improved WW2,
V1
> >jet to hit a city say at 200 miles and then targeted them at an US
ally
> >cities.
> >
> >Aiming would be pretty trivial, most modern cities are pretty big
anyway
> >and so what if a a lot miss? Its not like they cost me much anyway
each
> >missile.
>
> Aiming them is trivial. Producing them, storing them until needed,
> deploying them when needed, and launching them in a coordinated
> fashion *isn't*. (And all the steps in the process are vulnerable to
> disruption.)

Besides that, once the dirty deed has been done, the country that
launched them is in really deep s***. Even if they had a bunch of US
military weapons that they had managed to buy from the black market,
they would do about the same thing as a rock flung at a hornet's nest --
except that the rock flinger wouldn't be able to run away.

In the very worst case, the US might have to resort to expending a half
dozen or so ICBMs. Realistically, however, I can't see anything more
drastic than a few B-52 air raids upon all suspected military posts.


Ray Drouillard

"Michael Ash" > wrote in message
news:mail-F29439.19342618122003@localhost...
> In article >,
> Timothy Eisele > wrote:
>
> > In rec.arts.sf.science Michael Ash > wrote:
> > > Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular
army
> > > will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide
bombers.
> > > Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn
into a
> > > handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you
tried
> > > that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army,
but I
> > > don't think it would be that effective.
> >
> > Which is why the ideal complement to this strategy would be the
intensive
> > development of a really effective brainwashing technology. Once
your amoral
> > dictatorship has the ability to really deeply convince people on a
wholesale
> > basis that the regime is worth dying for, then you're in business.
> > Especially
> > since this will have the useful side benefit of greatly improving
your hold
> > on power with the general populace, if you can apply similar
technology to
> > them as well.
>
> Is 'brainwashing technology' somehow not in the same realm of fantasy
as
> 'magic fairy dust'? I was under the impression that it was something
you
> only found in bad novels and movies.

The Islamists are already brainwashing their children. There are
kindergarteners who think that the pinnacle of success is to kill Jews
by being a suicide bomber. They are already looking forward to the
umpteen virgins that will be given to them for their carnal pleasure
when the get to Heaven.


Ray

"pervect" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
> hunt) wrote:
>
> >What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> >country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> >against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> >years?
> >
> >I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> >cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> >very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> >Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> >made cheaply.
>
> How are you getting your position information?
>
> The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
> control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
> US, you can't count on your GPS working right.
>
> I don't know the details of the system (one reason I'm free to post) -
> but the absolute best case I can see is for you to force the US to
> basically shut off the GPS system everywhere. Depending on your
> weapons range, you may be able to force GPS nullification only in a
> limited area (the US can probably scramble the timing when the
> satellites are over the area threatened by your weapons, while leaving
> the timing intact when the satellites are over "safe" areas.
>
> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
> capability, but it would not eliminate it.

Even if the non-encrypted civilian access GPS is turned off, the
military system will work fine.


>
> From a terrorist POV - naw, it's pretty obvious, but I'll defer
> comment, no sense in making life easy for them.

"pervect" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 08:21:03 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
>
> >That is a decent description of the selective availability (SA)
function of
> >GPS. SA renders the average (non-US military) receiver incapable of
> >determining a precise fix, and you need precision for the kind of
weapons
> >the poster was postulating. SA was shut down a couple of years back
so that
> >civil users (i.e., surveyors, commercial aircraft, etc.) could take
> >advantage of its precision (prior to that occuring surveyors had to
use what
> >is known as "differential GPS", a more time consuming method of
achieving a
> >precise location), but according to the official USG website on the
subject
> >it can be reinstituted over a particular region at will.
> >
> >>
> >> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US
military
> >> capability, but it would not eliminate it.
> >
> >Actually, I don't think SA adversely affects US military systems.
> >
> >Brooks
>
> Processors and computing power are getting cheaper every year - and
> there are a lot of US weapons with military GPS around - so it's
> conceivable to me that someone could obtain one of these weapons and
> reverse-engineer the GPS system on them.

They can, but the signal is encrypted. The military can change the key
at will. In fact, I suspect that the keys are changed at least daily.

Even if you know all about the lock, you won't get a thing if you don't
have the key.


>
> If there is no sort of "auxiliary code input" to the weapon (i.e. some
> sort of activation code that has to be input) the reverse engineered
> weapons would work just as well as the US weapons, so the US would
> have to make the choice of whether it was better for everyone to have
> (accurate) GPS or nobody to have GPS.
>
> Without knowing for sure, I would personally expect that current
> weapons would have some sort of auxiliary code, and that this code
> would have to be entered as part of the target programming process
> (which is quite long according to news reports, though it's getting
> shorter).

I'm sure it's a private key system. The US issues keys (probably 1k
bits or more) to all units that need them. Contingency keys are also
issued. If someone captures the keys for next month, the contingency
keys are used.



Ray Drouillard

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 06:33:33 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr.
> wrote:
> >
> >> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> >> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> >> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> >> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> >> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> >> could be used).
> >
> >While 'swarming' ships with cruise missiles could possibly overwhelm
their
> >anti-missile systems, it is still not a feasible plan for an effective
> >weapon system. Think about it; how many missiles would be needed to get
> >through the anti-missile defenses and still cause major damage? 75? 100?
> >More? Per ship? Where are all of these missiles going to be set up and
> >launched from, and how are you going to keep them from being destroyed by
a
> >B-2 in the first 10 seconds of the war?
>
> Why would all the missiles have to be launched from the same
> location?
>

LOL.... now you're talking about *multiple* lauch & storage facilities, for
potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
same small targets *simultaneously*? The infrastructure and technology for
that undertaking would be even more cost prohibitive, but just as futile.
Even if they were somehow built and tested (extraordinarily unlikely);
again, what would stop *all* of these facilities from being taken out in the
first 10 seconds of the war? (And keep in mind that if just a couple of the
facilities were disrupted it would exponentially decrease the effectiveness
of the entire system). These systems would be nearly impossible to conceal,
and would be eliminated right off the bat, if not preemptively during their
testing phase (since nothing like this has been built, it would have to be
tested thoroughly, and that would be impossible to conceal. From there, it
wouldn't take long for US intel to deduce what the intent of such a system
is, and order it eliminated).

Face it, this is a bad idea.

Thomas J. Paladino Jr.
New York City

"Dionysios Pilarinos" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > > I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI
Harpy.
> It
> > > is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
> > > significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and
> even
> > > there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing
> or
> > > procuring).
> > >
> > > The question really is if it is possible to integrate different
sensors
> > (TV,
> > > IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
> > some
> > > signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be
(at
> > not
> > > killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).
> >
> > And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its
multi-billion
> > dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some
> second/third
> > world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the
> next
> > ten years? I don't.
>
> The US has a number of programs all employing various degrees of
> technological innovation. While money has been allocated into the research
> of new UAV/UCAV's, obviously that is a relatively small investment (when
> compared to the total budget). Even with those programs, human involvement
> seems to be essential in the operation of the system and targeting of the
> enemy. Obviously the program selection, funding, and priority given
differs
> from country to country. I'm just stating that another country could take
a
> position on this matter that might differ from that of the US.
>
> > > That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought
process
> > that
> > > goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
> > > systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
> weapon
> > > autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.
> >
> > Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location
in
> > their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference
from
> > going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or
not
> > radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
> placed
> > in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from
vehicle
> > FM radios is not going to work).
>
> There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced
sensor
> will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.) while
> "loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different
sensors
> can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
> 155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for fusing
> such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

SMArt is a contemporary of the (since cancelled?) SADARM. Both are
terminally guided munitions--emphasis on TERMINALLY. A far cry from being an
autonomous hunter/killer system capable of finding a target cluster and then
engaging it. You can add the BAT and even the Skeet terminally guided
submunitions to this same category, and the US has only recently fielded
cluster bombs capable of delivering these (including WCMD variant--CBU-105
IIRC). Great terminal killers--incapable of being wide area hunter killers
as this scheme posits.

>
> > > Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
> > about
> > > a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
> > > anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
> > overwhelmed.
> > > Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be
a
> > > better approach.
> >
> > I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty
complex
> CM
> > of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if
> you
> > are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
> > things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
> going
> > to cut it.
>
> A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
> human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion that
> few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.
>
> For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the cost
> has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is
not
> considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
> truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery of
3
> can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

Again, these are not autonomous systems you bring up. If you expect the
average second/third world foe to be able to (a) develop a UAV that is
capable of performing this kind of autonomous attack, (b) Make it small
enough to be survivable and useable in a field environment, while also
packing in all of the sensors and computers it needs to get there, and
weapons it needs to be lethal once it arrives, (c) Have it retain a
significant degree of survivability in the face of US defensive systems, and
(d) do all of this over the next ten years; then we are just going to have
to disagree, because I don't see all of that coming together until hell
freezes over.

>
> > They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
> > since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack
system
> > that does not currently exist even in the US.
>
> But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40
km
> away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles).
Why
> not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a
UAV
> (like the one used against radar transmissions)?

TERMINAL guidance only! They do not employ systems capable navigating the
delivery vehicle from launch point to attack point (preferably in a
survivable mode), of scanning wide areas, detecting a target, classifying
it, deciding to attack it, and then executing said attack, OK? BIG
difference from what the original poster posited.

>
> > Third, the number of Patiots
> > that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
> > missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
> > mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.
>
> How many Patriots are used against incoming artillery shells? Imagine that
> instead of artillery shells you have hundreds of self-guided UAV's. Even
> against a Harpy battery (54 incoming vehicles that will loiter until they
> detonate), what exactly can a Patriot battery do? Now imagine a few
hundred
> more, some targeting AD and others armored vehicles or ships.

The likely expeditionary corps will include some 500-1000 Patriots in its
ABL, with some one-third of those ready for immediate use. Add in another
boatload of Stingers mounted on everything from Avenger and BSFV to the
traditional MANPADS mount. What that adds up to is anything but asymetric
warfare--it is just about the opposite, with the foe trying to out-tech the
US--bad move IMO.

As to arty--let 'em fire. First rounds get picked up by the Firefinder
radars, and before their first volley has arrived the MLRS and ATACMS are on
the way towards smothering their firing locations. The intelligent foe does
NOT want to get into an arty duel with US forces--ask the Iraqis who tried
that during ODS (those that survived the counter-battery effort, that is).

>
> > Finally, we have
> > a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on
Avengers
> > and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.
>
> Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
> been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost
in
> the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've
never
> heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

I doubt we know exactly what system has accounted for many of the various
UAV losses over the years. Suffice it to say thet the RIM-92 Stinger is
capable of engaging both UAV's and CM's (there has been a fair amount of
work here in the US on developing the TTP's for use of Avenger specifically
in the anti-CM role).

>
> > Sorry, this just does not
> > look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper
tack--don't
> > try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
> > unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a
chance
> at
> > success of sorts.
>
> I'm not trying to get into the mind of every despot in the world. However,
> many of them invest time and money on conventional programs (like
ballistic
> missiles). Compared to a ballistic missile system, wouldn't a sensor-fused
> CM be a better investment?

Not if they lack the ISR system to be able to get it into the right target
box where it can release its SFW's, and that is not a very large footprint
that it has to hit. Not if they lack the ability to give the CM a pretty
good chance of survival. And most assuredly not if it is to be, as this
theory was posited, an autonomous attack system--that is just beyond the
capabilities of likely threats during the near-term period under
consideration.

>
> > > If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
> > weapons,
> > > you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss".
Depending
> > on
> > > the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
> > > allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
> > 100%.
> >
> > I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a
success
> > rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
> > resources that would have been better used training irregulars and
> creating
> > caches of weapons and explosives.
>
> Irregulars are not going to stop the advance of any regular army (their
> mission is quite different). What the army of a country needs to do is to
> target the enemy formations. As was proved once again in Iraq, it is
> suicidal to stand up against a better equipped and trained military in
order
> to fight a "conventional" war. The speed, accuracy and lethality ( the
> "punch") cannot be countered with 1960's defensive technology. You can
> however try to expose any weakness that might exist in the defenses of
your
> superior opponent (much like the Iraqi irregulars tried doing).

Sorry, but you are missing the whole concept of asymetric warfare. What you,
and the opriginal poster, are proposing is attacking the US military's
strengths, not its vulnerabilities--that is not asymetric. It is, however, a
good way to acheive martyrdom.

>
> > > The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time,
technology
> > has
> > > progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially
available
> > > components).
> >
> > Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
> > emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
> > disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the
> opposition
> > would be in such a scenario.
>
> How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic
position
> of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they could
> send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away
(using
> SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would have
> something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not last
> for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's away
> were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is remember
> the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

You just don't get it--you send all of the SMArt's you want at the "general
position" of a ground unit and you will most likely succeed in (a) littering
the desert with a lot of wasted SFW's, and (b) open your delivery forces up
to immediate, and lethal, return fires. SFW's have to be fired into a
position directly over the desired target--not 500 meters this way, or 500
meters that way--right over it. In realtime. Against a moving US force. Use
CNN all you want and it is not going to solve those problems.

Brooks

>
> > Brooks
>
>

On 18 Dec 2003 12:16:40 -0800, Jake McGuire > wrote:
>"Arved Sandstrom" > wrote in message >...
>> Incidentally, the other Western countries *are* middle-ranking countries, so
>> this is really a "how do we defend against the US" question. Under those
>> circumstances I think one simply does not attempt conventional warfare - not
>> in the time frame you suggest. You'd lose everything you have. You allow
>> yourself to be occupied, then you start making life bad.
>
>Does this mean that any war the US can win without occupying you is a
>lost cause?

It may well do. OTOH, if the USA wins, but loses an aircraft carrier
or a few hundred aircraft in the process, that would be a political
loss for the USA.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:22:04 GMT, Charles Gray > wrote:
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
>hunt) wrote:
>
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>
> Lets define "middle ranking" and "war" first. India and China are
>a far different matter from Pakistan, or SK/NK.

I wrote a long list of nations I had in mind in another post. All
the ones you mentioned above were on it (IIRC), except NK.

> The first thing you have to consider is that no middle ranking
>country could survive an "all out" conflit with the US, which means we
>want to avoid tactics that might lead to the conflict transforming
>into such a battle. No nukes, bio's, chems, etc. No direct attacks
>on the CONUS.

This is true.

>>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
>>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
>>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
>>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
>>made cheaply.
>
> For china, maybe. Pakistan or Iran or India? less likely.

All these countries have access to embedded computer technology;
Germany could make cruise missiles 60 years ago, indicating that it
can't be that difficult to do, so I expect all these countries could
make the other parts themselves.

> Even
>LCCM's are fairly high technology, and 'dead reckoning' isn't as easy
>as it sounds.

Why not?

> Cheap digistal cameras would be very easy to spoof-- smoke comes
>to mind,

Yes, but you can't light fires *everywhere*.

> and if you start going for IR systems, you've just stopped
>being "cheap".

That's mostly true, IR cameras cost around $5000. Probably it'd be
best to have plug-in sensors so ther operator could choose to add IR
when it's necessary for the job.

>Also, computer's and programs that can pick out
>targets against ground clutter are somewhat more difficult-- note the
>fact that even now the U.S. still prefers laser guided missiles, and I
>don't believe we have any autonomous weapons like this in stock
>(although some are being made ready). The problems are tremendous.

<sarcasm>Well, obviously, if the USA can't do it, no-one else
can.</sarcasm>

>>Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
>>difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
>>vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
>>easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
>>bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
>>could be used).
>
> More doable-- but if it isn't an active system, well the ocean is a
>very big place. If it is, then it's either expensive, or very easy to
>spoof.
> As for a swarm, how to you choose targets? If there isn't any
>inter-communiation, your entire swarm will attack the first ship it
>sees...which usually won't be a major target. If there is inter-UAV
>communication, you're back to having a very expensive system that even
>the U.S. hasn't quite figured out, and is far beyhond the capabiliies
>of most other nations.

Swarm co-ordination is a software problem. To solve it, you need a
few clever postgrad students, properly managed.

> The problems is that these weapons wouldn't be "low cost" for other
>nations-- they'd be major projects, taking forever because most
>mid-range nations that migbht be in conflict with the West don't have
>the vast depth of technical expertese we do.

But you don't need "vast depth". With the exception of computer and
imaging technology, *everything* you need to make a cruise missile
is 1940s tech.

> One example-- low cost bombs using GPS and inertial guidence were
>developed and fielded by the U.S.-- while the system itself is "low
>cost" the effort to develop it is anything but. Low cost loitering
>UAV's and cruise missiles are in development-- in the U.S. and UK. I
>think maybe China and India might be able to conduct a design effort
>like you sugggest, but it woudl be hard for them, and I can't see
>other nations, like Pakistan, any African nations, or even smaller
>western nations like Austraila, Canada, or Italy being able to even
>come close.

The idea that Italy couldn't make a cruise missile is silly IMO.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:28:28 GMT, Charles Gray > wrote:
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
>hunt) wrote:
>
>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?
>>
>
> Concentrate on training and developing a professional officers
>corps. No matter the technology if your soldiers are uneducated
>draftees who don't want ot be there, and your officers were chosen
>for: "Who paid the highest bribe" or "who is least likely to be able
>to carry off a coup", you'll get your butt kicked.


This is very sensible advice.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:45:55 +0000, Simon Morden > wrote:
>Michael Ash wrote:
>
>> I do recall thinking, during the
>> fall of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, that a trained monkey could
>> probably do a better job of defending that country. Take all of those
>> army units that got surrounded/wiped out/whatever and simply distribute
>> them throughout the cities. Give each one a rifle, give RPGs to as many
>> as you can. Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
>> Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
>> busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
>> put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.
>
>I concur. If the Iraqis had been as determined as say, the Soviets in defense of
>Leningrad and Stalingrad, the choices would have been between bomb Baghdad flat or
>suffer massive casualties.
>
>Thank God they weren't.

Indeed. It would have been a bloodbath.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

Chad Irby > wrote:

(Derek Lyons) wrote:
>
>> Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to
>> train the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute
>> them when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of
>> themselves. (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)
>
>That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
>a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
>but logistics is what wins wars.

Yep. Some time back a gentleman asked over on sci.military.naval what
it would take to build a small, modern, and regionally important naval
force. He was quite taken aback when the vast majority of the
responses emphasized all the 'non-sexy' bits. (Repair parts, repair
training, DC training, countermeasures, infrastructure, general
training, communications...)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Jarg" > wrote:
>An interesting if, but the Soviets, though at an apparent disadvantage,
>weren't faced with such overwhelming military power, and had a history of
>successfully repelling invaders.

The Russians could, and on multiple occasions did, trade space for
time, forcing the invader endure their winter. No other nation shares
this unique combination of vast space for mobilty with climactic
advantages.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
...
> ISTM that there are two possible objectives:
>
> 1) deterring the large power from starting a war
>
> 2) minimizing the damage a war does to the citizens
>
> Countries involved in terrorist-risistance campaigns tend to be
> unpleasant places to live. Resistance campaigns at home may have
> some outcome influencing effect (Nam was sold to the American
> publicv that way), but attacks on the larger country seem
> counter-productive as Afghanistan and Chechnya (Sp?) are
> discovering. Possibly non-terrorist strategies aimed at attacking
> the big country at home would back-fire simillarly.
>
> Probably some combination of being a tough nut to crack, giving
> up something the aggressor wants and persuading others that their
> interests are served by helping out is the winning strategy.
>
> Two countries faced with large, belligerent neighbours in the
> thirties were Poland and Finland. Neither neighbour could be
> bought off. The latter did rather well, the former poorly. Are
> there lessons in their experience?

1. First lesson - Geography matters. Poland is rather flat and good tank
country.
Finland is not. Even in modern times, nobody wanted to do a ground campaign
in
the Balkans - the terrain is too tough. Saddam Hussein, military genius,
twice
managed to manuever (or be manuevered) into playing tanks in a sandbox.
Good
idea if you got the quantity and quality. Bad idea otherwise.

2. See #1

Lance


>
> Peter Skelton

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:53:21 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>"phil hunt" > wrote in message
.. .
>> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks >
>wrote:
>> >
>> >> I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
>> >> attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
>> >> there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
>> >> involved in the decision to fire.
>> >
>> >That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous
>combat
>> >systems.
>>
>> Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>> written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>> picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>> target.
>
>"The programming for this isn't particularly hard"?

Read the rest of the sentence: "...once you've written software
that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a picture"

I could probably have phrased that better.

>LOL! If it only knows "within a few km or so" where it is, then news
>flash--you won't even be able to use that puppy against a CVN. Your
>postulated
>brilliant-CM-on-a-shoestring-budget-able-to-be-manufactured-by-anyone is
>sounding more and more ludicrous.

I'm sure thast large warships can be sighted several km away.

>> The topographic data would probably be available if the missile is
>> flying over the territory of its own country.
>
>You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
>handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
>have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
>compact enough to fit in your missile,

You do realise, you can get hard disks small enought otfit in your
hand, that store tens of gigabytes these days?

> and is capable of extremely rapid
>computational work,

Today we have 3 GHz processors. Every 12-18 months speed doubles. I
doubt if processing speed will be a problem.

>> Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
>> celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.
>
>Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up.

No, because you use multiple transmitters, which aren't all switched
on at once, plus large numbers of fake transmitters there to be
targets for bombs. The transmitters can shift frequencies and use
short transmissions, to further reduce the probability of being
detected.

>Automated
>celestial tracking/guidance is not the purview of the amateur,

LORAN was around 40 years ago; therefore any country with
1960s-equivalent tech should be able to build one.

> and I doubt
>you would get the requisite accuracy from such a system mounted on such a
>small platform.

Why is the platform size an issue?

> DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
>missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and say, "Gee, that was
>tough--time for a beer!"

Again, why would DR not work?


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:22:04 GMT, Charles Gray > wrote:
> >On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
> >hunt) wrote:
> >
> >>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> >>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> >>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> >>years?
> >
> > Lets define "middle ranking" and "war" first. India and China are
> >a far different matter from Pakistan, or SK/NK.
>
> I wrote a long list of nations I had in mind in another post. All
> the ones you mentioned above were on it (IIRC), except NK.
>
> > The first thing you have to consider is that no middle ranking
> >country could survive an "all out" conflit with the US, which means we
> >want to avoid tactics that might lead to the conflict transforming
> >into such a battle. No nukes, bio's, chems, etc. No direct attacks
> >on the CONUS.
>
> This is true.
>
> >>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> >>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> >>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> >>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> >>made cheaply.
> >
> > For china, maybe. Pakistan or Iran or India? less likely.
>
> All these countries have access to embedded computer technology;
> Germany could make cruise missiles 60 years ago, indicating that it
> can't be that difficult to do, so I expect all these countries could
> make the other parts themselves.

Merely having some degree of computer capability is not going to cut it; and
likening the V-1 to the kind of autonomous sytem you posit is laughable.

>
> > Even
> >LCCM's are fairly high technology, and 'dead reckoning' isn't as easy
> >as it sounds.
>
> Why not?

Accumulated error, for one thing; you can't count on GPS for positional
updates. Your LORAN idea fell flatter than a pancake. So you are now left
with trying to cobble together an inertial nav system--more weight and
complexity, more R&D required, and in the end it is not going to give you
the kind of accuracy you need over the distances you will have to negotiate.

>
> > Cheap digistal cameras would be very easy to spoof-- smoke comes
> >to mind,
>
> Yes, but you can't light fires *everywhere*.

What? You do know what those nifty little stubby, multi-barrel thingies
mounted on all of our armored vehicles are, don't you? And you don't have to
light fires--smoke pots work quite well, as do onboard smoke generators.

>
> > and if you start going for IR systems, you've just stopped
> >being "cheap".
>
> That's mostly true, IR cameras cost around $5000. Probably it'd be
> best to have plug-in sensors so ther operator could choose to add IR
> when it's necessary for the job.

Now you need a whole new set of target data--more R&D again.

>
> >Also, computer's and programs that can pick out
> >targets against ground clutter are somewhat more difficult-- note the
> >fact that even now the U.S. still prefers laser guided missiles, and I
> >don't believe we have any autonomous weapons like this in stock
> >(although some are being made ready). The problems are tremendous.
>
> <sarcasm>Well, obviously, if the USA can't do it, no-one else
> can.</sarcasm>

The hell with your sarcasm, the fact is that it is a hell of a lot harder
nut to crack than you seem to comprehend. If you think otherwise, you need
to go into business for yourself and offer us this wonderful, cheap, easily
produced autonomous attack system to ther DoD. Guarantee they'd buy it--if
it worked, that is...

>
> >>Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> >>difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> >>vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> >>easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> >>bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> >>could be used).
> >
> > More doable-- but if it isn't an active system, well the ocean is a
> >very big place. If it is, then it's either expensive, or very easy to
> >spoof.
> > As for a swarm, how to you choose targets? If there isn't any
> >inter-communiation, your entire swarm will attack the first ship it
> >sees...which usually won't be a major target. If there is inter-UAV
> >communication, you're back to having a very expensive system that even
> >the U.S. hasn't quite figured out, and is far beyhond the capabiliies
> >of most other nations.
>
> Swarm co-ordination is a software problem. To solve it, you need a
> few clever postgrad students, properly managed.

ROFLOL! Gee, I guess you also consider AI to be something you can acheive
over next weekend, right? Your habit of taking every serious problem with
your pet theory here and writing it off as a "software problem which is easy
to take care of" is getting a bit monotonous.

>
> > The problems is that these weapons wouldn't be "low cost" for other
> >nations-- they'd be major projects, taking forever because most
> >mid-range nations that migbht be in conflict with the West don't have
> >the vast depth of technical expertese we do.
>
> But you don't need "vast depth". With the exception of computer and
> imaging technology, *everything* you need to make a cruise missile
> is 1940s tech.

Not if you want to make one that is lethal in the modern era.

>
> > One example-- low cost bombs using GPS and inertial guidence were
> >developed and fielded by the U.S.-- while the system itself is "low
> >cost" the effort to develop it is anything but. Low cost loitering
> >UAV's and cruise missiles are in development-- in the U.S. and UK. I
> >think maybe China and India might be able to conduct a design effort
> >like you sugggest, but it woudl be hard for them, and I can't see
> >other nations, like Pakistan, any African nations, or even smaller
> >western nations like Austraila, Canada, or Italy being able to even
> >come close.

Hell, india has not managed to get their Arjun tank project in order, and
Phil thinks they could pull this autonomous hunter/killer scheme off?

>
> The idea that Italy couldn't make a cruise missile is silly IMO.

Sure they could--but they can't make the autonomous uberweapon you have
posited. Nothing to be ashamed of--right now neither can we. But you can,
because all of the problems are mere exercises in writing a few lines of new
code, right?

Brooks

Derek Lyons > wrote:
>>That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
>>a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
>>but logistics is what wins wars.
>
>Yep. Some time back a gentleman asked over on sci.military.naval what
>it would take to build a small, modern, and regionally important naval
>force. He was quite taken aback when the vast majority of the
>responses emphasized all the 'non-sexy' bits. (Repair parts, repair
>training, DC training, countermeasures, infrastructure, general
>training, communications...)

I recall a conversation reported or paraphrased in Proceedings
in the late 1970s. Someone noted to a senior admiral, I think,
that the equipment on paper specs for the new Aegis ships weren't
much better than the previous generation of missile cruisers,
other than the really great multi-target capability from SPY-1.
Missile range, target director capabilities, etc.

The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
rather than 55%".

That lesson is hard even for well funded navies...


-george william herbert

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 06:33:33 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr.
> wrote:
> >
> >> Another target for LCCMs would be surface ships. Telling tghe
> >> difference between a ship and water is easier than detecting land
> >> vehicles (detecting what sort of ship it is would also be quite
> >> easy, I imagine). Anti ship missiles would probably want ot have a
> >> bigger warhead than anti-land force missiles (or a 'swarm' option
> >> could be used).
> >
> >While 'swarming' ships with cruise missiles could possibly overwhelm
their
> >anti-missile systems, it is still not a feasible plan for an effective
> >weapon system. Think about it; how many missiles would be needed to get
> >through the anti-missile defenses and still cause major damage? 75? 100?
> >More? Per ship? Where are all of these missiles going to be set up and
> >launched from, and how are you going to keep them from being destroyed by
a
> >B-2 in the first 10 seconds of the war?
>
> Why would all the missiles have to be launched from the same
> location?
>

LOL.... now you're talking about *multiple* lauch & storage facilities, for
potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
same small targets *simultaneously*? The infrastructure and technology for
that undertaking would be even more cost prohibitive, but just as futile.
Even if they were somehow built and tested (extraordinarily unlikely);
again, what would stop *all* of these facilities from being taken out in the
first 10 seconds of the war? (And keep in mind that if just a couple of the
facilities were disrupted it would exponentially decrease the effectiveness
of the entire system). These systems would be nearly impossible to conceal,
and would be eliminated right off the bat --if not preemptively during their
testing phase (since nothing like this has been built, it would have to be
tested thoroughly, and that would be impossible to conceal. From there, it
wouldn't take long for US intel to deduce what the intent of such a system
is, and order it eliminated).

Face it, this is a bad idea.

Thomas J. Paladino Jr.
New York City

In article <mail-F29439.19342618122003@localhost>, Michael Ash wrote:
> Is 'brainwashing technology' somehow not in the same realm of fantasy as
> 'magic fairy dust'? I was under the impression that it was something you
> only found in bad novels and movies.

Fox News? The Sun? ;-)

--
I give confidential press briefings.
You leak.
He's been charged under section 2a of the Official Secrets act.
-- Irregular verbs, Yes Prime Minister.

George William Herbert wrote:

> The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
> rather than 55%".

As I understand it, one of the things that motivated the invention
of integrated circuits was reliability -- of naval electronics
and avionics. The systems were coming up against the limits
of what one could reliably do with discrete components.

Paul

In article >,
Mike Williams > wrote:

> The last I heard, the projected date for the launch of the Galileo Next
> Generation Global Navigation Satellite System was some time in 2005, so
> after that date there could be an alternative to the American GPS.
> However, anyone who's at war with the US is likely to be also disliked
> by the Europeans behind Galileo, and might find that they can't get good
> readings from either system.

It doesn't really matter whether the enemy is on good terms with Europe
or not. Just because it's a European system doesn't mean the US can't
jam it into uselesness as soon as hostilities begin.

In article >,
phil hunt > wrote:
>I've worked as a programmer for
>defense contractors (and for other large organisations), and believe
>me, there is a *lot* of waste and inefficiency. If the software was
>written right, it could probably be done with several orders of
>magnitude more efficiency.

What competing method is there except for Open Source?

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

In article >,
phil hunt > wrote:
>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>target.

Have you looked up "Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance" by Zarchan
(ISBN 1-56347-254-6) like I recommended?

>The missile would know (at least
>approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
>it is over land occupied by its own side.

How will the information-gathering to determine the alliegance of
each square click be organized? How quickly can this organization get
information and collate it? How will that information be sent to the
launch sites? How will the launch sites input it into the missile?
*How accurate and timely will it be?*

Note that at the end of Desert Storm, Swartzkopf designated a spot for
ceasefire talks with the Iraqis that he thought was held by the US. But
it wasn't. The units that he thought were there were several kilometers
away.

>(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

In article <mail-BF72AE.19331618122003@localhost>,
Michael Ash > wrote:
>In any case, I fully believe you. My statement was mostly CYA. I don't
>think that making everybody be a suicide bomber is terribly effective,
>but I don't know enough to rule it out.

Remember that suicide bombings was something the palestinians started
with because Israel had countered all their previous methods of attack:
Cross border raids, cross border artillery, airplane hijackings,
storming embassies, leaving bombs in public places etc etc.
Of course, they are trying to make a virtue out of this necessity now.

>Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
>Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
>busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
>put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.

More probably most of the grunts were too smart to follow such orders
and bugged out the second the Colonel left them.

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

In article >,
phil hunt > wrote:
>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 13:09:48 +0100, Michael Ash > wrote:
>>
>>Well, don't forget that only a very tiny percentage of any regular army
>>will be composed of people fanatical enough to become suicide bombers.
>>Your four-million strong Elbonian People's Happy Army will turn into a
>>handful of suicide bombers and a whole bunch of deserters if you tried
>>that strategy. Not to say it may not be the best use of that army, but I
>>don't think it would be that effective.
>
>Indeed. Developing and caching weapons that allow people to be
>guerrillas with reduced risk to themselves (such as time-delayed
>mortars) would seem an obvious thing to do.

But there are no ranging shots with such mortars: Its fire for effect
from the first round. They'd have trouble hitting a barn, if it was
smaller than 10 Downing Street.

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

(Derek Lyons) wrote in message >...
> (phil hunt) wrote:
>
> >If they can be mass-produced for $10,000 each, then a $1 bn
> >procurement -- and the sort of countries we're talking about
> >typically sign bigger weapons contracts than that -- would buy
> >100,000 missiles.
>
> Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to train
> the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute them
> when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of themselves.
> (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

Let's also not forget that the effort required to develop, test,
produce,
store, train troops for, and, eventually, deploy some massive amount
of
(Low Cost Cruise Missiles/Uninvented Mystery Munitions/Diesel
Subs/whatever)
has to be done in complete and total secrecy. It doesn't do you any
good to come up with your stuff if the first act of teh war is to bob
the depots holding it. Or, if you're favoring a surprise/preemptive
strike, the weapons are observed moving from the depots, thus alerting
the target. While there
may be some holes in U.S. Intel, out ability to find and follow that
sort of stuff us pretty good. (Before you go holding up Iraq as a
counterexample, please note that prior to 1990, there was very little
in-depth coverage of Iraq, so new patterns were hard to spot. They
also managed to score some coups by doing stuff that was unexpected,
such as pursuing the use of Calutrons, long obsolescent for reasons of
inefficiency, for Uranium enrichment. They can, for example, hide the
buildings, but they can't hide the electical generators or the
transmission lines, and it becomes a matter of following the leads.
Or, perhaps, one of the Bright Young Guys following the activity of
your factories in the Trade Publications notes an upswing in certain
activities.

So, to cut short a bit - If producing some massive amount of cheap
somethings
is even feasible, it won't do you a bit of good unless you can hide it
from
the watchful eyes of the NRO and the NSA. You can hide little stuff,
but not the sort of overwhelming swarm that's been postulated so far.

--
Pete Stickney

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 21:40:13 -0500, Ray Drouillard > wrote:
>
> "pervect" > wrote in message
>>
>> Denying the US use of GPS would have a negative impact on US military
>> capability, but it would not eliminate it.
>
> Even if the non-encrypted civilian access GPS is turned off, the
> military system will work fine.

Not entirely. Older military GPS receivers use the less
precise civilian signal to get a coarse position fix before
they lock onto and receive the military signal. If the
civilian signal was turned off entirely, these receivers would
either take an extremely long time to initialize after being
turned on, or would not be able to get a position at all.


ljd

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 05:54:28 +0000, phil hunt > wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:53:21 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>>
>>"The programming for this isn't particularly hard"?
>
> Read the rest of the sentence: "...once you've written software
> that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a picture"
>
> I could probably have phrased that better.

Like, say, "The programming for this isn't particularly hard,
once you've waved your hands and assumed all the really hard
bits are already done"?

>[...]

>>You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
>>handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
>>have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
>>compact enough to fit in your missile,
>
> You do realise, you can get hard disks small enought otfit in your
> hand, that store tens of gigabytes these days?

Of course you can. Just because you have somewhere to put the
data doesn't mean the data is easy to acquire, though.

You can get detailed digital elevation data for the United States
(horizontal resolution of 30 meters for the lower 48, 90 meters
for Alaska), but that's because the United States Geological Survey
has gone to a great deal of effort to compile it and make it
available.

How many other countries have done the same? Does the
Royal Elbonian Survey Office even have decent 1:24,000
topographic map coverage of Elbonia to use as a starting
point for compiling a digital elevation model?

>[...]
>>Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up.
>
> No, because you use multiple transmitters, which aren't all switched
> on at once, plus large numbers of fake transmitters there to be
> targets for bombs.

LORAN transmitter sites are not small. Check out

<http://www.megapulse.com/lorsys.html>

for a picture of a modern solid-state transmitter -- they
don't need water cooling systems any more, apparently, but
you still need a large room with a HVAC system capable of
handling "moderate air-conditioning loads".

That's nothing compared to the size of the antennas, though.
A LORAN transmitter station typically has multiple guyed
antenna masts with heights ranging between 300 and 1,000 feet.

You are not going to be able to build lots of them,
and you definitely can't move them around.

> The transmitters can shift frequencies and use
> short transmissions, to further reduce the probability of being
> detected.

Great -- now all you need to do is figure out how to
hide a forest of immobile antenna masts that are hundreds
of feet tall.

>>Automated celestial tracking/guidance is not the purview
>>of the amateur, and I doubt you would get the requisite
>>accuracy from such a system mounted on such a
>>small platform.
>
> Why is the platform size an issue?

You need a stable platform for accurate celestial navigation.
A small aircraft-sized HLCCM isn't it, and semi-accurate celestial
navigation only tells you your position to within 5-10 miles.

You also need to be able to see the stars, so using celestial
navigation would mean your HLCCM would only be able to navigate
to its target if it was night and the weather was clear.

Automated celestial navigation is really only practical for
vehicles that operate outside the Earth's atmosphere --
spacecraft and ICBMs.

>>DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
>>missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and
>>say, "Gee, that was tough--time for a beer!"
>
> Again, why would DR not work?

Because dead reckoning is the least accurate form of
navigation. Do you really want your HLCCMs to miss
their targets by miles because the wind changed
direction after they were launched?


ljd

"Mike Williams" > wrote in message
...
> Wasn't it pervect who wrote:
> >On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 03:22:52 +0000, (phil
> >hunt) wrote:
> >
> >>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> >>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> >>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> >>years?
> >>
> >>I think one strategy would be to use large numbers of low cost
> >>cruise missiles (LCCM). The elements of a cruise missile are all
> >>very simple, mature technology, except for the guidance system.
> >>Modern computers are small and cheap, so guidance systems can be
> >>made cheaply.
> >
> >How are you getting your position information?
> >
> >The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
> >control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
> >US, you can't count on your GPS working right.
>
> The last I heard, the projected date for the launch of the Galileo
Next
> Generation Global Navigation Satellite System was some time in 2005,
so
> after that date there could be an alternative to the American GPS.
> However, anyone who's at war with the US is likely to be also disliked
> by the Europeans behind Galileo, and might find that they can't get
good
> readings from either system.

Also, since it's not encrypted, it can be spoofed using a local
transmitter -- and that spoofing won't affect the American GPS system at
all.


Ray Drouillard

(George William Herbert) wrote:
>The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
>rather than 55%".
>
>That lesson is hard even for well funded navies...

<nods> And that's where the low cost frightfulness proposed elsewhere
in this thread really falls down.

It's pretty much a given that a decent cruise bird can be built for
around $10k. However, I'd be willing to wager a bottle of beverage of
choice that their reliability won't exceed 50%. That's high enough
for a terror campaign, but as a useful military weapon, it's nowhere
near enough. 'Cheap' weapons aren't nearly as cheap when you have to
launch *four* $10k birds to ensure that *one* lands on target.
Lacking assurance of a kill adds greatly to the difficulties your
offense must face, and complicates your logistics chain.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Paul F. Dietz" > wrote:
>George William Herbert wrote:
>> The response was "Yes, but now they're working 95% of the time,
>> rather than 55%".
>
>As I understand it, one of the things that motivated the invention
>of integrated circuits was reliability -- of naval electronics
>and avionics. The systems were coming up against the limits
>of what one could reliably do with discrete components.

Reliability comes not just from increasing MTBF, but in decreasing
MTTR. BITE (Built In Test Equipment), modular electronics, designing
for maintenance... All these things go into increasing uptime, and
IC's make them all much easier.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>>You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
>>handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
>>have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
>>compact enough to fit in your missile,
>
>You do realise, you can get hard disks small enought otfit in your
>hand, that store tens of gigabytes these days?

You do realize the problem isn't *storing* the data, it's *generating
and integrating it*. It's not a matter of storage, or CPU capacity,
but of analysis and algorithms. (A friend of mine recently generated
a 3-d topo of our county as the first step in building an integrated
GIS for the local water department. Took six months.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> Done thirty years ago with assorted single launchers (basically just a
> rail and a stand) to point a 107mm or 122mm rocket targetwards, and a
> countdown timer to fire it minutes or hours after the guerilla has
> departed.
>
> If you're lucky then you can plant it on the hospital roof, across the
> street from the orphanage and next door to the elementary school, and
> tip off the news crews so that any enemy counterbattery fire is widely
> reported.

Of course, how hard would it be to add GPS guidance to a Katyusha rocket? If
you could bring the CEP down to 10m or so and still have a warhead of 10kg
(the 122mm Katyusha has a 20kg warhead so this is at least plausible), you'd
have a very, very nasty weapon for insurgents (target checkpoints, the
people trying to evac the victims of the latest road-side bomb, etc.) or
terrorists (target parked commercial aircraft at a gate, the 50-yard line at
the Super bowl, etc.).

The Katyusha has a range of around 20km so the only defense would be hard
cover (tough to arrange everywhere), active defenses (which have yet to be
fielded), or GPS-spoofing. The last is possible but it diminishes the
usefulness of GPS for your side as well.

(phil hunt) wrote:
>>> Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
>>> celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.
>>
>>Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up.
>
>No, because you use multiple transmitters, which aren't all switched
>on at once, plus large numbers of fake transmitters there to be
>targets for bombs. The transmitters can shift frequencies and use
>short transmissions, to further reduce the probability of being
>detected.

All of which increases the cost and complexity of your missile
guidance system. It has to; store *all* possible stations,be able to
determine which master/slave complex is currently active, and
determine which frequencies to use. Not easy, not easy at all.

(Setting aside the difficulties of setting up such a system.)

>>Automated celestial tracking/guidance is not the purview of the
>amateur,
>
>LORAN was around 40 years ago; therefore any country with
>1960s-equivalent tech should be able to build one.

Nice dodge there, failing to address the issue of celestial
navigation.

And sorry, the assumption that anyone can easily do something that was
done forty years ago is invalid on it's face. A LORAN system requires
complex electronics, accurate surveying, guaranteed power, good sized
antenna... All non-trivial, none cheap, and none 'garage' compatible.

>> DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
>>missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and say, "Gee, that was
>>tough--time for a beer!"
>
>Again, why would DR not work?

Because all navigation system accumulate inaccuracy as time-of-flight
increases. Without periodic updates, you are almost ensured of
failing to hit your target.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"phil hunt" > wrote in
> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> years?

To deal with the US Army...
Use SUVs with anti-tank rockets and a millimetric radar mounted on the back.
In iraq US gunners opened fire at 5miles. Since the rounds travel at a
mile/second, this would give an SUV 5 seconds to dudge, which would be
simple with guidence from the radar. Meanwhile the top-attack missiles tear
through the thin turret roofs. Buy a few otto-76mm armed tanks with dual use
surface/air to deal with incomming aircraft/missiles/bombs/helicopters and
to rip enemy soldiers to pieces.

To deal with the US Air Force...
Buy old airliners and fit with reloadable missile launchers and modern AA
radar, counter measures, and refueling probe. Take old fighter designs, and
hang them fully fueled and armed from ballons. That'll multiply thier
endurance by a factor of ten at least. Fit search-radar in envelope and have
them patrol your boarder. Network them together and you'll have an end to
surprise US attacks.

To deal with the US Navy...
Buy old torpedos and fit to larch home made rockets (see X-prize entries)
with 50-100 mile range. Get the rockets to dump the torpedos within a few
miles of a nimitz carrier groups and you're garanteed to blow up something
*really* expensive!

Alternatively buy the following:
1 million RPG-7s
5 million RPG-7 rounds
10 million AK-74s
1 billion bullets
Distribute evenly through out your population, train them, set up a
Swiss-style monitoring system, and let the Americans invade. Then blow up
everything of value they own the second they let their guard down. They'll
leave in a few months and you can go back to normal.

Alternatively fly a few airliners into american nuclear power stations. The
aftermath of multiple chernobles will destroy America as an effective
strategic power.

ANTIcarrot.

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 01:30:28 GMT, "Anthony Garcia"
> wrote:



>If it were easy to hit troops with self-targeting systems don't you think
>the U.S. would be doing it already?

I think the hard thing to do is to avoid incidental civilian
casualties with self-targetting systems.

This is probably enough to scrap the idea in the US, which is public
ally committed to the idea of avoiding avoidable harm to
non-combatants. I'm a little bit cynical as to how this works out in
practice, but I do think that most of the high-ranking staff officers
do try to make battle plans that will minimize civilian casualties.
Probably the main difficulty is that battles don't always follow the
battle plans....

How did I get off on that topic? Anyway, I really don't know how well
the idea would work if bystander casualties were not a concern. It
seems to me that we would not actually know until the idea was built
and tested, and we probably would not really know until it was used in
the field. I think that the intimal development of such weapons would
be prohibitively expensive if it were carried out by a government.
It's possible that some private companies might be able to develop
such weapons at a reasonable cost (and a significant risk that they
would not work after being developed), but it's unclear if they would
perceive the market demand for them to justify the cost and the risk.

(Derek Lyons) writes:

(phil hunt) wrote:
>>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>>picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>>target.

>ROTFL. Yes, once you master the extraordinarily difficult task of
>writing software to identify a target, then pretty much else is
>simple.

Actually, it isn't. Even given a simple, absolute, "the target is
3.7 degrees left of and 1.1 degrees below sensor boresight axis",
determining the flight control outputs that will steer the missile
towards the target is a Very Hard Problem. Actually implementing
those flight control problems in hardware is another. Simplistic
"steer the missile towards the target" solutions, tend to result
in divergent oscillations that end up with the missile tumbling
out of the control. Simplistic solutions to that one, tend to
result in the missile always being behind the curve and losing
sight of the target in the terminal approach.

Getting it right, requires a lot of specialized knowledge, a lot
of analysis and design work, and a lot of testing.


>But you appear to be underestimating the effort needed to
>write that software.

Standard hacker arrogance. All hardware problems can be solved
in software, and all software problems can be solved by two guys
with a case of Jolt cola and a long weekend.

For problems where this is actually true, there's nothing better
than unleashing a top hacker. Designing cruise missiles, as it
turns out, is not such a problem. It can probably be done an
order of magnitude faster, better, and cheaper than the major
military powers do it, but that requires a first-rate technical
and managerial team working under ideal conditions, and it's
still an order of magnitude harder and more expensive than he
imagines.

Doing it when the Generalissimo demands that his ne'r-do-well
son-in-law have an important part in the project team, the
Ministry of Security has a suspicious eye on some of the top
people you actually *want*, and you need to work through three
middlemen and a smuggler just to get a good oscilliscope, is
probably right out.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 21:40:13 -0500, "Ray Drouillard"
> wrote:



>Even if the non-encrypted civilian access GPS is turned off, the
>military system will work fine.

Yes, another poster pointed that out, so I stand corrected. Also,
because the signals coming from the satellites are apparently spread
spectrum, it will be much less easy to reverse-engineer the codes than
I anticipated. Because we know what the output of the atomic clocks
should be, we know what the "clear" signal has to be. So I expected
extreme difficulties in encoding these signals - it's like trying to
design a good code when you have someone with access to the plaintext
working on breaking it.

However, with the spread spectrum approach, the difficulty will be to
be able to detect the signal in the broad-band noise.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 21:11:31 -0500, "Ray Drouillard"
> wrote:

>
>"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>One word: Surrender

And don't wait - surrender right now! We are Borg, your ass will be
immolated.

(Sorry, but I couldn't resist).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 20:10:41 -0000, "John"
> wrote:

>"phil hunt" > wrote in
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>To deal with the US Army...
>Use SUVs with anti-tank rockets and a millimetric radar mounted on the back.
>In iraq US gunners opened fire at 5miles. Since the rounds travel at a
>mile/second, this would give an SUV 5 seconds to dudge, which would be
>simple with guidence from the radar. Meanwhile the top-attack missiles tear
>through the thin turret roofs. Buy a few otto-76mm armed tanks with dual use
>surface/air to deal with incomming aircraft/missiles/bombs/helicopters and
>to rip enemy soldiers to pieces.
>
And watch them all die horribly. SUV's will be picked up by the
forward screens of the army units, which can shoot them up just
wonderfully-- not only that, but the first thing the U.S. will do is
nail the SUV's from the air. Cluster muntions do horrible things to
lightly armored vehicles.
In addition, some hotsmoke rounds already incorporate anti-radar
chaff. You can't move until the warhead hits-- because if you're
using vehicle mounted radar, that's probably a form of beam rider of
SAH guidence. Both are eminiently jammable.
76mm AA tanks have been developed (although none are in service as
far as I know-- the Italians evidently weren't able to sell them), but
they have the simple problem of being big enough to be killed from far
out side the 76mm range-- you're going to have B2's and B1's dropping
LCAS GPS guided weapons, and all sorts of other wonderful stuff from
quite far out of range, cued in by UAVs which the Air force doesn't
mind losing at all.


>To deal with the US Air Force...
>Buy old airliners and fit with reloadable missile launchers and modern AA
>radar, counter measures, and refueling probe. Take old fighter designs, and
>hang them fully fueled and armed from ballons. That'll multiply thier
>endurance by a factor of ten at least. Fit search-radar in envelope and have
>them patrol your boarder. Network them together and you'll have an end to
>surprise US attacks.

And woudl you prefer to do this before, or after we develop the
anti-matter driven beam cannons? integrating things like AA missiles
into a civilian air frame is incredibly complex, and as for dangling
fighters from ballons, that's just silly. Not only that, but they'll
be blinded by ECM, painted by AWACs and killed from a long way off by
fighters.
Networkign is a nice phrase-- how exactly do you intend to do this
against the most technologically advanced power on earth? Note he
specificed mid-range powers, which means mid-range budget. This
concept, even if it would work, would break the bank of the United
States, which means no other nation could even concieve of it.

The most logical plan is to expect to conceede air superiority, and
try for things that deny us air-supremacy. If you can get them, lots
of V/Stols.and very carefully concealed air supply depots.
>
>To deal with the US Navy...
>Buy old torpedos and fit to larch home made rockets (see X-prize entries)
>with 50-100 mile range. Get the rockets to dump the torpedos within a few
>miles of a nimitz carrier groups and you're garanteed to blow up something
>*really* expensive!
>
Getting a torpedo to successfully deploy from a rocket, in working
condition is far, far more difficult-- and no Nimitz class BG is going
to get within 100 miles of your coast until those rocket launchers are
dead, dead, dead.


>Alternatively buy the following:
>1 million RPG-7s
>5 million RPG-7 rounds
>10 million AK-74s
>1 billion bullets
>Distribute evenly through out your population, train them, set up a
>Swiss-style monitoring system, and let the Americans invade. Then blow up
>everything of value they own the second they let their guard down. They'll
>leave in a few months and you can go back to normal.
Expensive-- and begs the question of will the people fight. Still,
probably the most logical solution here. The U.S.'s greatest weakness
has always been long term guerilla conflits.


>
>Alternatively fly a few airliners into american nuclear power stations. The
>aftermath of multiple chernobles will destroy America as an effective
>strategic power.

1. You won't get mutiple Chernobles. We have somewhat more effective
designs than the russians, taht don't blow up quite as
enthusiastically into steam explosions. In many cases, you probably
won't even fully breach the containment building. You will get some
release of radiation, but not the doomsday amounts you expect.
2. Congratulations. You've just launched a strategic attack on the
United States. We'll see your airliners, and raise you a few nuclear
strikes on major military bases.
Alternately, we'll just go fully to war, decide not to count the
cost, and dig out every soldier above the rank of Lt. and shoot him.
Direct attacks on teh U.S. by any identifiable nation is a big like
walking up to a grizzly bear and smacking him in the nose. Not smart.

"phil hunt" > wrote

> I imagine the missiles could
> be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
> cable into a slot on the missile.

Here ya go. Code to this explanation, and you're all set.

http://www.techblvd.com/Rvideo/Guidance.wav

Easy.

Pete

I've been given some consideration to this topic, and beyond some of
the proposals, I do have a question about one possible tactic.
First of all, buying some Mig-29's, Rafaels, or F-16's just gives
the USN and USAF more targets. You cannot buy enough to make any
difference, they will be quantitatively outnumbered and qualitatively
outgunned (few nations will have such refinements as AWAC's) and will
be shot down, leaving the USAF free to do as it pleases. Ditto for
the bases, which will be killed fairly quickly.

Now, in the 1980's, the birtish had the idea of the Small Agile
Battle Field Aircraft (SABA), which in some incarnations was a fanjet
(pusher style) aircraft with 6 hardpoints for sidewinders, and a 25mm
internal gun for use against tanks and helicopters. THe idea with the
thing was that it was small, fairly cheap, agile, and very STOL (so
you could use open fields). Instead of trying for air superiroity by
an uber plane it tried for survivability by being able to have lots of
them, and very dispersed basing.

Now, if I was a second or third teir nation thinking of engaging
the U.S., I'd want this.
i'm not going to gain air superiority, but if I can keep the air
force looking to squash allthe cheap cockroach planes I have out
there, they might not be able to fully concentrate on CAS either.
also, since my planes operate close to the ground, i may be able to
lure some jets down to where AAA can get at them, and heck, I might
even be able to get some CAS of my own in.

Now, would this be viable? Note, I'm not saying "coudl I win",
because in an all out, there will be only one likely outcome, but
"could it make more trouble for the U.S. than a tarmac load of
Mig-29's or other expensive jets."

"Mike Williams" > wrote
> >
> >The cheap solution is to use GPS. But IIRC the US has complete
> >control over the GPS satellite system. So if you are at war with the
> >US, you can't count on your GPS working right.
>
> The last I heard, the projected date for the launch of the Galileo Next
> Generation Global Navigation Satellite System was some time in 2005, so
> after that date there could be an alternative to the American GPS.
> However, anyone who's at war with the US is likely to be also disliked
> by the Europeans behind Galileo, and might find that they can't get good
> readings from either system.

As of this month, Galileo is already subject to US
control/degradation/jamming if necessary.

http://makeashorterlink.com/?W25942BD6
from www.tagesschau.de [bablefish translation]
"Galileo will work on a frequency, which is at any time easily influenceable
for American of military. Without consulting Europe, American armed forces
will be able to switch off the European satellite navigation system Galileo
in crisis and conflicts likewise, as this already happens with the American
global Positioning system (government inspection department). "

Pete

"John" > wrote:

> To deal with the US Army...
> Use SUVs with anti-tank rockets and a millimetric radar mounted on the back.
> In iraq US gunners opened fire at 5miles. Since the rounds travel at a
> mile/second, this would give an SUV 5 seconds to dudge, which would be
> simple with guidence from the radar. Meanwhile the top-attack missiles tear
> through the thin turret roofs.

Except you'd need a *lot* of these, to make sure you had a decent force
survive after the initial artillery attacks from over the horizon.
Since they're soft targets, you could pretty much remove them from the
battlefield with a couple of loads of smart munitions. If you don't
have a lot of these SUV-type machines, you have to worry about
everything from bombs on down. Then you also have to worry about
command and control, which adds another couple of layers of complexity
to the issue.

> Buy a few otto-76mm armed tanks with dual use
> surface/air to deal with incomming aircraft/missiles/bombs/helicopters and
> to rip enemy soldiers to pieces.

If you have anything less than a *lot* of armor, you're pretty much
screwed when it comes to maneuver warfare... and those tanks are also
vulnerable to pretty much everything else on the battlefield.

> To deal with the US Air Force...
> Buy old airliners and fit with reloadable missile launchers and modern AA
> radar, counter measures, and refueling probe. Take old fighter designs, and
> hang them fully fueled and armed from ballons. That'll multiply thier
> endurance by a factor of ten at least. Fit search-radar in envelope and have
> them patrol your boarder. Network them together and you'll have an end to
> surprise US attacks.

Old airliners with radar signatures about the size of a medium-sized
mall. And by the time anyone manages to get any of these fielded,
they're going to have to worry about airborne lasers and hypervelocity
missiles.

> To deal with the US Navy...
> Buy old torpedos and fit to larch home made rockets (see X-prize
> entries) with 50-100 mile range. Get the rockets to dump the torpedos
> within a few miles of a nimitz carrier groups and you're garanteed to
> blow up something *really* expensive!

....if you ever get the chance to shoot them. You're not going to see
carrier groups within a hundred miles of a hostile coast until well
after any reasonable defenses/offenses are pretty much toast.

> Alternatively buy the following:
> 1 million RPG-7s
> 5 million RPG-7 rounds
> 10 million AK-74s
> 1 billion bullets
> Distribute evenly through out your population, train them, set up a
> Swiss-style monitoring system, and let the Americans invade. Then blow up
> everything of value they own the second they let their guard down. They'll
> leave in a few months and you can go back to normal.

This is assuming that the US is going to invade, say, Norway.

If the US is going to invade some place a couple of orders of magnitude
more likely (like Iran or Syria), you're never going to see anything
like a trained population. You're going to see, well, a lot of places
with the overall military presence of Iraq or Afghanistan. Which had
the armanents you speak of, but would *never* have the ability to let
the population get that strong, or a command structure that would
possibly let the populace get that into their heads. Look at Iraq,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, et al.

The weapons list above, by the way, is pretty close to what we ran into
in Iraq. Notice how nothing like what you suggest ever happened.

> Alternatively fly a few airliners into american nuclear power stations. The
> aftermath of multiple chernobles will destroy America as an effective
> strategic power.

Not so much. For one thing, you'd ignoring the fact that *nobody* could
manage that any more with any hope of success. For another, you'd have
to hope that an airliner *could* cause that sort of damage (modern
containment domes were designed, in part, to prevent just that). Even
in the worst case, you're looking at limited damage and a loss of some
power generation capability, not a reduction in strategic power.

The other thing is that any country or series of countries that even
tried it would be erased from the face of the Earth, at least
militarily, and everyone who even had a vague suspicion of being
involved would be in much deeper **** than anyone seems to be able to
imagine. Remember when all of the terror folks thought the US would
fold right after 9/11, and we started ripping everyone new assholes?
Multiply that by a hundred.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In article >,
pervect > wrote:

> Yes, another poster pointed that out, so I stand corrected. Also,
> because the signals coming from the satellites are apparently spread
> spectrum, it will be much less easy to reverse-engineer the codes than
> I anticipated. Because we know what the output of the atomic clocks
> should be, we know what the "clear" signal has to be. So I expected
> extreme difficulties in encoding these signals - it's like trying to
> design a good code when you have someone with access to the plaintext
> working on breaking it.

Assuming that the GPS project was reasonably competent when it came to
encryption, the encryption alone should be an insurmountable challenge.
Encryption which can't be reverse-engineered (by which I mean, you can
publish everything about the system except the keys and it's still
perfectly secure) has been pretty much a solved problem for quite some
time, barring revolutionary new mathematical techniques. The only hard
part is the key distribution. So you'd have to steal a key close enough
to your launch time for that key to still be valid, and do it in such a
way that nobody catches on and changes the key sooner than usual. Having
the plaintext for a section of code text is not, afaik, very much help
when it comes to cracking modern codes.

"Bryan J. Maloney" > wrote in message
93.32...
> (phil hunt) nattered on
> . org:
>
> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> > years?
>
> Orbital laser satellites, preferably mind-control lasers. If not that,
> then frickin' sharks with frickin' laser beams in their heads.

It also would be helpful to shout, "Somebody throw me a bone here!"

ROFL!!!!

Charles Gray > wrote:

>also, since my planes operate close to the ground, i may be able to
>lure some jets down to where AAA can get at them,

Among other things, this is *exactly* why long range look-down
shoot-down capability has been chased by the big boys for decades now,
and is actually more-or-less working.

>THe idea with the thing was that it was small, fairly cheap, agile, and very
>STOL (so you could use open fields). Instead of trying for air superiroity by
>an uber plane it tried for survivability by being able to have lots of
>them, and very dispersed basing.

While a popular idea, it's not without it's drawbacks. You need a
sophisticated (and very vulnerable) logistics system to get bullets,
bombs and fuel forward to the aircraft. You need a sophisticated C3I
system to get target data forward to the aircraft. While sitting on
the ground, especially near the FEBA, the aircraft is extraordinarily
vulnerable.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

Charles Gray > wrote:

> The most logical plan is to expect to conceede air superiority, and
>try for things that deny us air-supremacy. If you can get them, lots
>of V/Stols.and very carefully concealed air supply depots.

They'll stay concealed until someone tries to use them.... The
J-STARS picks up the trucks, an intel weenie figures out the
truck/airplane cycle and... Your depot gets a visit from the USAF.

One thing the US is getting good at, is identifying the head, and
cutting it away from the body.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Ray Drouillard" > wrote in message >...
> "phil hunt" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> > years?
>
> One word: Surrender

Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
in...'

http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer

"David Pugh" -cay> wrote in message >...
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Done thirty years ago with assorted single launchers (basically just a
> > rail and a stand) to point a 107mm or 122mm rocket targetwards, and a
> > countdown timer to fire it minutes or hours after the guerilla has
> > departed.
> >
> > If you're lucky then you can plant it on the hospital roof, across the
> > street from the orphanage and next door to the elementary school, and
> > tip off the news crews so that any enemy counterbattery fire is widely
> > reported.
>
> Of course, how hard would it be to add GPS guidance to a Katyusha rocket? If
> you could bring the CEP down to 10m or so and still have a warhead of 10kg
> (the 122mm Katyusha has a 20kg warhead so this is at least plausible), you'd
> have a very, very nasty weapon for insurgents (target checkpoints, the
> people trying to evac the victims of the latest road-side bomb, etc.) or
> terrorists (target parked commercial aircraft at a gate, the 50-yard line at
> the Super bowl, etc.).
>
> The Katyusha has a range of around 20km so the only defense would be hard
> cover (tough to arrange everywhere), active defenses (which have yet to be
> fielded), or GPS-spoofing. The last is possible but it diminishes the
> usefulness of GPS for your side as well.

The problem is there is no system of guidance on the 122, other than
the direction you aim it and the elevation. It leaves, it goes, it
lands.

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 23:31:06 GMT, (Derek
Lyons) wrote:

>Charles Gray > wrote:
>
>>also, since my planes operate close to the ground, i may be able to
>>lure some jets down to where AAA can get at them,
>
>Among other things, this is *exactly* why long range look-down
>shoot-down capability has been chased by the big boys for decades now,
>and is actually more-or-less working.
>
True-- while the Rutan's version of the SABA had some stealth
characteristics, I don't think the average small nation can make all
composite aircraft.
Still, 50 propjobs well dispsersed will last longer than 10
Mig-29's needing a mile long runway. (of course, "Longer" in this case
might simple equal a day as oposed to a few hours.)


>>THe idea with the thing was that it was small, fairly cheap, agile, and very
>>STOL (so you could use open fields). Instead of trying for air superiroity by
>>an uber plane it tried for survivability by being able to have lots of
>>them, and very dispersed basing.
>
>While a popular idea, it's not without it's drawbacks. You need a
>sophisticated (and very vulnerable) logistics system to get bullets,
>bombs and fuel forward to the aircraft. You need a sophisticated C3I
>system to get target data forward to the aircraft.
You could establish a lot of single use caches, say a single disguised
truck by a field with enough fuel and ammo for a single reload. That
woudl, however, take a LOT of planning.
The biggest problem, as you pointed out, as that in 10 years the US
will probably be having UAV traffic jams, and the day of concealing
something with silly little camaflauge net is well in the past.


>While sitting on
>the ground, especially near the FEBA, the aircraft is extraordinarily
>vulnerable.
>
>D.
Oh true-- if I had my druthers I'd also back this up with some
effective SAMs.
the problem is that unless there is a really paradigm shifting
devleopment, any second teir nation that fights the U.S. is going to
lose-- the best you could do would be make it a loss that also cost
the U.S. something.
Unfortunately, al these ideas require a professional, trained
military service, and 3rd world dictatorships tend to avoid those for
obvious reasons.

On 19 Dec 2003 15:42:36 -0800, (Jack
Linthicum) wrote:

>"Ray Drouillard" > wrote in message >...
>> "phil hunt" > wrote in message
>> . ..
>> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> > years?
>>
>> One word: Surrender
>
>Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
>strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
>the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
>ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
>your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
>August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
>in...'

Or just avoid the whole invasion to begin with. Right up until the
final ultimatum, Saddam probably could have avoided an invasion with
unconditional surrender of all bases, etc, to U.S. inspection.
Would we have let him stay in power? Would he have survived the
loss of prestige? I don't know, but his chances were sure as hell
higher than getting into a shooting match with the United States.

>>What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>>country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>>against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>>years?

For the peer competitor,even more accelerated downsizing classical military
power and even more accelerated development of HPM weapons.
For others, more attack platforms guided by Mk.I eyeballs and armed with box
cutters.

"Charles Gray" > wrote in message
...
> On 19 Dec 2003 15:42:36 -0800, (Jack
> Linthicum) wrote:
>
> >"Ray Drouillard" > wrote in message
>...
> >> "phil hunt" > wrote in message
> >> . ..
> >> > What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
> >> > country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a
war
> >> > against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
> >> > years?
> >>
> >> One word: Surrender
> >
> >Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand
Fenwick
> >strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
> >the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of
AK-47s,
> >ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
> >your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
> >August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
> >in...'
>
> Or just avoid the whole invasion to begin with. Right up until the
> final ultimatum, Saddam probably could have avoided an invasion with
> unconditional surrender of all bases, etc, to U.S. inspection.
> Would we have let him stay in power? Would he have survived the
> loss of prestige? I don't know, but his chances were sure as hell
> higher than getting into a shooting match with the United States.

He was left in power ten years ago. I think that GWB has learned from
his father's mistake, however.

In other cases, a non-despotic leader will probably be able to retain
power.



Ray Drouillard

In article >,
(Jack Linthicum) wrote:

> Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
> strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
> the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
> ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
> your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
> August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
> in...'
>
> http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer

He got a "freebie" in the first part of the exercise, and managed to
"sink" a lot of the US fleet (which would *not* have happened in real
life, with the intel and resources he had available) so they reset the
exercise. This is "gaming the exercise, not the scenario," and it takes
advantage of holes in the exercise that aren't meant to model the real
world.

He then went to a low-tech communications mode, to "beat" the high-tech
intel that the US normally gets when fighting against pretty much anyone
else in the real world, and expected to have 100% effectiveness in
fighting the game. Of course, his low-tech methods (motorcycle couriers
and personal communications) were degraded by the exercise monitors,
like they would be in real life.

Some of the other results were very much non-real, like sneak attacks
that only succeeded because the one guy sitting at a terminal was
looking something up, and missed the first warnings - something that
couldn't happen in reality, with hundreds of people out there to notice
troop movements.

The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction of
the deaths and a shorter war.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 21:11:31 -0500, "Ray Drouillard"
> wrote:

>
>"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
>One word: Surrender

I must admit that this post by Ray has motivated me to consider the
original problem more thoroughly :-)

One of the primary goals, as I see it, is to try and maintain control
over the air. If a country can control it's airspace, the US (or
perhaps China or Russia or whatever major power is becoming
bellicose), being at the end of a very long supply chain, is going to
have some serious supply problems.

However, it will be very difficult and expensive to maintain an air
force capable of battling it out in the air with US forces, if it is
even possible at all.

I think the problem can be subdivided into two problems - the first is
the aircraft carrier issue, the second is ground based aircraft.

Nukes are a definite possibility for sea "defense", IMO. While I'm
sure the US won't be happy to have a carrier fleet nuked, it seems to
me that it is a lot less likely to result in your country being turned
into a plain of glass than a nuclear attack on ground based forces.
The delivery system of choice remains a problem. I would think a
relatively unguided ballistic missile would be the best choice,
especially if it could be reasonably well armored. Decoys would also
aid penetration. If terminal guidance technology becomes advanced
enough, the decoys can be given conventional warheads and seeking
capability.


However, it would be better to do the job without nukes if possible.
The original idea of autonomous weapons might be able to work here (as
in the terminal guidance missile weapons I mentioned above, or
LCCM's). Torpedoes are another definite possibility, to avoid having
to deal with the antimissile and point defenses. They'd either have
to have a very long range, or be air droppable, or preferrable both
(but I'm not sure how feasible it would be to have both).

The next problem is the one of ground based aircraft. Anti-runway
weapons seem to me to be the weapon of choice here. This is another
area in which LCCM's or terminally guided munitions might work well.

Ray Drouillard > wrote:
>> > Crewed by Alien Space Bats, presumably?
>>
>> European or African alien space bats?
>
>What is the flight speed of an unladen African alien space bat?

Cheeee!


-george

On 19 Dec 2003 15:42:36 -0800, (Jack
Linthicum) wrote:


>Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
>strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
>the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
>ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
>your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
>August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
>in...'
>
>http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
>http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer

General Ripper. Now there's a name that brings back memories.

http://wso.williams.edu/~mhacker/strangelove4.html

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
>
> > Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
> > strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
> > the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
> > ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
> > your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
> > August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
> > in...'
> >
> > http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
> > http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer
>
> He got a "freebie" in the first part of the exercise, and managed to
> "sink" a lot of the US fleet (which would *not* have happened in real
> life, with the intel and resources he had available) so they reset the
> exercise. This is "gaming the exercise, not the scenario," and it takes
> advantage of holes in the exercise that aren't meant to model the real
> world.
>
> He then went to a low-tech communications mode, to "beat" the high-tech
> intel that the US normally gets when fighting against pretty much anyone
> else in the real world, and expected to have 100% effectiveness in
> fighting the game. Of course, his low-tech methods (motorcycle couriers
> and personal communications) were degraded by the exercise monitors,
> like they would be in real life.
>

Present situation seems to duplicate that low tech communications
mode. So far.

> Some of the other results were very much non-real, like sneak attacks
> that only succeeded because the one guy sitting at a terminal was
> looking something up, and missed the first warnings - something that
> couldn't happen in reality, with hundreds of people out there to notice
> troop movements.
>
You are assuming 'troop movements' the present situation is guys
hiding in mosques or behind children ambushing GIs who get out of the
protective zone.

> The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
> optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction of
> the deaths and a shorter war.

We expected a war from March to way past December?

"Jack Linthicum" > wrote in message
om...
> Chad Irby > wrote in message
>...
> > In article >,
> > (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
> >
> > > Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
> > > strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
> > > the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
> > > ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
> > > your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
> > > August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
> > > in...'
> > >
> > > http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
> > >
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer
> >
> > He got a "freebie" in the first part of the exercise, and managed to
> > "sink" a lot of the US fleet (which would *not* have happened in real
> > life, with the intel and resources he had available) so they reset the
> > exercise. This is "gaming the exercise, not the scenario," and it takes
> > advantage of holes in the exercise that aren't meant to model the real
> > world.
> >
> > He then went to a low-tech communications mode, to "beat" the high-tech
> > intel that the US normally gets when fighting against pretty much anyone
> > else in the real world, and expected to have 100% effectiveness in
> > fighting the game. Of course, his low-tech methods (motorcycle couriers
> > and personal communications) were degraded by the exercise monitors,
> > like they would be in real life.
> >
>
> Present situation seems to duplicate that low tech communications
> mode. So far.

You know that for a fact, Jack?

>
> > Some of the other results were very much non-real, like sneak attacks
> > that only succeeded because the one guy sitting at a terminal was
> > looking something up, and missed the first warnings - something that
> > couldn't happen in reality, with hundreds of people out there to notice
> > troop movements.
> >
> You are assuming 'troop movements' the present situation is guys
> hiding in mosques or behind children ambushing GIs who get out of the
> protective zone.

You were trying to use Van Riper as your example--he was NOT modeling
two-three man sniper attacks during that simulation though, was he? The
biggest problem with van Riper was that he allowed his ego to outgrow the
goals of the exercise and tried to effectively hijack it midstream. He was
unprofessional and extremely unrealistic--if you are running a corps-plus
level exercise, you are not going to be creating accurate models of low
level combat in the first place, and every swinging Richard who has ever
played in the BBS-CBS arena knows that.

>
> > The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
> > optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction of
> > the deaths and a shorter war.
>
> We expected a war from March to way past December?

Recommend you go back to misunderstanding the wierd world of your mythical
micro-nukes, Jack--this subject is obviously beyond your comprehension
level.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 22:17:34 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>>The problems listed above are information-processing problems, that
>>is, software problems. Does it really require billions of dollars to
>>solve these problems? I say no: a few small groups of really
>>competent programms can be many times more productive than how
>>software is traditionally written.
>
>The issue isn't programmers Phil. The issue the massive amounts of
>R&D to develop the information needed to specify the sensor that the
>programmers will process the output of.

The sensors needed are visual and IR imaging. It doesn't require a
massive R&D program to determine that, or to decide which
combinations of number of pixels and widths of field of view are
appropriate.

>The issue is the massive
>amount of R&D needed to develop the algorithms the programmers will
>implement to analyze the output of the sensor.

Do you know anything about programming? If you did, you'd know that
developing algorithms is what programmers do.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 06:17:02 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
>> > Even
>> >LCCM's are fairly high technology, and 'dead reckoning' isn't as easy
>> >as it sounds.
>>
>> Why not?
>
>Accumulated error, for one thing; you can't count on GPS for positional
>updates.

Say the error is 1%. Then it'd be 1 km off on a 100 km journey.
That's close enough for terminal homing to

>Your LORAN idea fell flatter than a pancake.

No it didn't.

> So you are now left
>with trying to cobble together an inertial nav system--more weight and
>complexity, more R&D required, and in the end it is not going to give you
>the kind of accuracy you need over the distances you will have to negotiate.

Are you an expert on inertial nav systems? If so, how much
weight/cost? If not...

>> > Cheap digistal cameras would be very easy to spoof-- smoke comes
>> >to mind,
>>
>> Yes, but you can't light fires *everywhere*.
>
>What? You do know what those nifty little stubby, multi-barrel thingies
>mounted on all of our armored vehicles are, don't you?

Yes. But they can't be firing *all the time* just in case they are
going to be attacked. True, they could fire when they've spotted an
incoming missile, assuimng they do spot it. The missile could
perhaps go away and come back 5 minutes later, or it could alter
other forces to the target location, or it could fly through the
smoke (it travels a lot faster than the targets). Or it could use
sensors that can see through smoke -- I'm not sure if IR or radar
would work.

>> > and if you start going for IR systems, you've just stopped
>> >being "cheap".
>>
>> That's mostly true, IR cameras cost around $5000. Probably it'd be
>> best to have plug-in sensors so ther operator could choose to add IR
>> when it's necessary for the job.
>
>Now you need a whole new set of target data--more R&D again.

I'm not sure it would be that much more. For the main application of
spotting moving vehicles you could probably use essentially the same
software. Also, the shape of objects under IR is the same as under
visual light.

>> >Also, computer's and programs that can pick out
>> >targets against ground clutter are somewhat more difficult-- note the
>> >fact that even now the U.S. still prefers laser guided missiles, and I
>> >don't believe we have any autonomous weapons like this in stock
>> >(although some are being made ready). The problems are tremendous.
>>
>> <sarcasm>Well, obviously, if the USA can't do it, no-one else
>> can.</sarcasm>
>
>The hell with your sarcasm, the fact is that it is a hell of a lot harder
>nut to crack than you seem to comprehend. If you think otherwise, you need
>to go into business for yourself and offer us this wonderful, cheap, easily
>produced autonomous attack system to ther DoD.

My understanding -- and I've heard this from multiple sources -- is
that in defence procurement it's not how good your product is, it's
who you know.

>> Swarm co-ordination is a software problem. To solve it, you need a
>> few clever postgrad students, properly managed.
>
>ROFLOL! Gee, I guess you also consider AI to be something you can acheive
>over next weekend, right?

Er, no, I didn't say that. And in any case, swarm co-ordination is
obviously not AI-complete, as you would know if you knew anything
about it at all.

> Your habit of taking every serious problem with
>your pet theory here and writing it off as a "software problem which is easy
>to take care of" is getting a bit monotonous.

Do you know anything about software? I've been a programmer all my
professional life, and I like to think that I do have some
understanding of the field.

>> > One example-- low cost bombs using GPS and inertial guidence were
>> >developed and fielded by the U.S.-- while the system itself is "low
>> >cost" the effort to develop it is anything but. Low cost loitering
>> >UAV's and cruise missiles are in development-- in the U.S. and UK. I
>> >think maybe China and India might be able to conduct a design effort
>> >like you sugggest, but it woudl be hard for them, and I can't see
>> >other nations, like Pakistan, any African nations, or even smaller
>> >western nations like Austraila, Canada, or Italy being able to even
>> >come close.
>
>Hell, india has not managed to get their Arjun tank project in order, and
>Phil thinks they could pull this autonomous hunter/killer scheme off?

They could technologically. Whether they could managerially is
another question entirely.

>> The idea that Italy couldn't make a cruise missile is silly IMO.
>
>Sure they could--but they can't make the autonomous uberweapon you have
>posited. Nothing to be ashamed of--right now neither can we. But you can,
>because all of the problems are mere exercises in writing a few lines of new
>code, right?

A few hundred thousand lines, more like.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 09:12:47 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr. > wrote:
>
>LOL.... now you're talking about *multiple* lauch & storage facilities,

Launch facility = a land rover and trailer

storage facility = any building will do

>for
>potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
>same small targets *simultaneously*?

co-ordination = radio

>The infrastructure and technology for
>that undertaking would be even more cost prohibitive, but just as futile.
>Even if they were somehow built and tested (extraordinarily unlikely);
>again, what would stop *all* of these facilities from being taken out in the
>first 10 seconds of the war?

Knowing where they are?

Did the USA knock out all Iraqu tanks at the start of the 2003 or
1991 wars? No, it did not, unlike in your worthless comtemptable
idiot strawman scenario. Did the USA knock out all Serbian tanks in
the Kosovo war? they didn't in the whole war, let alone the first
ten minutes.

>Face it, this is a bad idea.

Face it, you're an idiot bull****ter.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> >
> > > The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
> > > optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction of
> > > the deaths and a shorter war.
> >
> > We expected a war from March to way past December?
>
> Recommend you go back to misunderstanding the wierd world of your mythical
> micro-nukes, Jack--this subject is obviously beyond your comprehension
> level.

Then we did expect a war to last from onset to at least nine months?
It is still going on you know.

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> "Jack Linthicum" > wrote in message
> om...
> > Chad Irby > wrote in message
> >...
> > > In article >,
> > > (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
> > >
> > > > Precisely, and make that about March 10th 2003. It's the Grand Fenwick
> > > > strategy, you lose, retain all of your weaponry that counts, and drag
> > > > the opponent into a situation where he can't win. An armory of AK-47s,
> > > > ammo, RPGs, ammo, Land mines, Mortar rounds, whatever you can bury in
> > > > your front, or back, yard. General Van Riper told us this back in
> > > > August 2002. We said he was cheating. No one remembers 'alls fair
> > > > in...'
> > > >
> > > > http://sgtstryker.com.cr.sabren.com/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=2887
> > > >
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A28161-2002Aug16?language=printer
> > >
> > > He got a "freebie" in the first part of the exercise, and managed to
> > > "sink" a lot of the US fleet (which would *not* have happened in real
> > > life, with the intel and resources he had available) so they reset the
> > > exercise. This is "gaming the exercise, not the scenario," and it takes
> > > advantage of holes in the exercise that aren't meant to model the real
> > > world.
> > >
> > > He then went to a low-tech communications mode, to "beat" the high-tech
> > > intel that the US normally gets when fighting against pretty much anyone
> > > else in the real world, and expected to have 100% effectiveness in
> > > fighting the game. Of course, his low-tech methods (motorcycle couriers
> > > and personal communications) were degraded by the exercise monitors,
> > > like they would be in real life.
> > >
> >
> > Present situation seems to duplicate that low tech communications
> > mode. So far.
>
> You know that for a fact, Jack?


anybody intercepting their communications?

Didn't they use pigeons or some birds as an early warning device?
http://news.findlaw.com/ap_stories/i/1107/12-16-2003/20031216064501_02.html

When we find Russian or Chinese or French spread spectrum or agile
radios we can change that tune, until then it's Winnetou and the
screeching owl.

On 19 Dec 2003 15:38:09 GMT, Bertil Jonell > wrote:
>In article >,
>phil hunt > wrote:
>>I've worked as a programmer for
>>defense contractors (and for other large organisations), and believe
>>me, there is a *lot* of waste and inefficiency. If the software was
>>written right, it could probably be done with several orders of
>>magnitude more efficiency.
>
> What competing method is there except for Open Source?

Open source -- or rather, using some of the ideas from how OSS
projects are btypically run -- is certainly useful. Employing the
best people (the top 10% of programmers are probably 10 times more
productive than the average, and 100 times more productive than the
bottom 10%) is important, as is encouraging debate (in a
non-threatening atmosphere) as to what can be done better.

Extreme Programming has some very good ideas, as do other Agile
techniques. Collaborative systems for discussing evolving software
projects -- mailing lists, wikis, etc -- are good. Usingn the right
programming tools is important, for example the right lasnguasge or
(more likely) set of languages. On which lanugages to use, Paul
Graham's essays on language design, and the way Lisp makes it easy
for you to in effect write your own specialised language for the job
in hand, are apposite.

Concentration on software quality involves lack of caring about
other criteria, so forcing employees to wear strangulation devices,
or unnecessarily attending work at particular hours, are
counterproductive in themselves as well as being symptomatic of
wider PHB-ism.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On 19 Dec 2003 15:56:55 GMT, Bertil Jonell > wrote:
>In article >,
>phil hunt > wrote:
>>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>>picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
>>target.
>
> Have you looked up "Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance" by Zarchan
>(ISBN 1-56347-254-6) like I recommended?

I haven't -- I tend not to read off-net sources, due to time, space
and money constraints.

>>The missile would know (at least
>>approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
>>it is over land occupied by its own side.
>
> How will the information-gathering to determine the alliegance of
>each square click be organized? How quickly can this organization get
>information and collate it?

I'm sure the information won't be entirely accurate.

>How will that information be sent to the
>launch sites?

As part of a general military communications network.

> How will the launch sites input it into the missile?

As part of the general military comms network; the network would use
Internet technology wherever possible, and the software to input it
into the missile would probsably be identical to the software
dealing with it in other nodes. (Since they'd all be internet
devices).

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 22:25:54 +0000, Paul J. Adam > wrote:
>In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>>>That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous combat
>>>systems.
>>
>>Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
>>written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
>>picture.
>
>Falling off a cliff isn't a problem once you've learned how to fly like
>Superman.
>
>Trouble is, that prerequisite is harder than you might expect.
>
>Getting a machine to tell a T-72 from a M1A1 from a Leclerc is hard
>enough in good conditions

You don't have to. You have to be able to tell whether it's a
vehicle or not, and if it is, is it in an area likely to be occupied
by own forces.

>: doing so in the presence of camouflage,
>obscurants and when the crew have run out of internal stowage (so have
>hung lots of external gear) and maybe stored some spare track plates on
>the glacis front ('cause they need the spare plates and they might as
>well be extra armour) gets _really_ tricky. Do you err on the side of
>"tank-like vehicle, kill!" or "if you're not sure don't attack"?

I'd tend to err towards the former. note that it's a lot easy to
spot a moving vehicle than a stationary one.

>Would it not be embarrasing to have a successful armoured raid broken up
>by your own missiles?

Indeed. Maybe some form of IFF?

>Key problem is that going up against the US loses you your comms and
>observation

I doubt that that is true, assuming a competent comms network.

>DR is patchy at best unless you've got good inertial guidance systems
>(non-trivial). Celestial only works on clear nights

Or during daytime.

> - so you're limited
>to fighting wars after dark on cloudless nights with no flares in the
>sky. LORAN is a radio broadcast and therefore not survivable against a
>US-style opponent.

If you have lots of transmitters, many of which are dummy
transmitters, and many of which are only turned on for a short time,
using frequency hopping, it's rather harder to destroy the network.

>>>or up high where the view is better,
>>
>>It's possible that a mission might require some of the flight to be
>>at high level and some at low level. I imagine the missiles could
>>be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
>>cable into a slot on the missile.
>
>This has only been done for twenty years or so in the West, so hardly a
>great advance.

I never said it was; it is merely the obvious way to do it.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 13:43:49 -0500, Ray Drouillard > wrote:
>
>Also, since it's not encrypted, it can be spoofed using a local
>transmitter

That doesn't logically follow; it's possible to make non-encrypted
data that can't be faked, you just use a digital signature.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 18:56:18 GMT, Derek Lyons
> wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>
>>>You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
>>>handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
>>>have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
>>>compact enough to fit in your missile,
>>
>>You do realise, you can get hard disks small enought otfit in your
>>hand, that store tens of gigabytes these days?
>
>You do realize the problem isn't *storing* the data,

If you were more literate, you would realise that I was replying to
the the point "remain compact enough to fit in your missile".

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 19:05:46 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>
>>> DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
>>>missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and say, "Gee, that was
>>>tough--time for a beer!"
>>
>>Again, why would DR not work?
>
>Because all navigation system accumulate inaccuracy as time-of-flight
>increases.

Well, that's obvious. it's how quickly it accumulates innaccuracy
that matters.

> Without periodic updates, you are almost ensured of
>failing to hit your target.

Unless you have some other method of terminal guidance.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

In article >,
"John" > writes:
> "phil hunt" > wrote in
>> What would be sensible strategies/weapons for a middle-ranking
>> country to employ if it thought it is likely to be involved in a war
>> against the USA or other Western countries, say in the next 10
>> years?
>
> To deal with the US Army...
> Use SUVs with anti-tank rockets and a millimetric radar mounted on the back.
> In iraq US gunners opened fire at 5miles. Since the rounds travel at a
> mile/second, this would give an SUV 5 seconds to dudge, which would be
> simple with guidence from the radar. Meanwhile the top-attack missiles tear
> through the thin turret roofs. Buy a few otto-76mm armed tanks with dual use
> surface/air to deal with incomming aircraft/missiles/bombs/helicopters and
> to rip enemy soldiers to pieces.

5 seconds to dodge... Dodge where, exqctly? In what direction? How
much? To be at the least effective, you're going to have to somehow
get 1 vehicle's size distance away from where you were. Since SUV's
don't move a 1 mile/second...
Oh, and what if the Rascally Americans don't open fire at 5 miles
Becasue there's in a city, or there's intervening terrain, or you're
not a visible target, and engave at a shorter distance? (Which is what
happens. Even 500m (1500') is long range when you're not shooting at,
say, Iraqi tanks in the open desert. In that case, they wouldn't be
engaging SUV-type things with Main Gun rounds. ('cause it would go
through the SUV, and the SUV behind the SUV, and the Tree behing the
SUV behing the SUV, and the School behind the tree - you get the
idea) They'd use either the .50 cal MG on the turret top, or teh .30
cal co-ax. (Don't discount the Coax. It's got a dedicated gunner
with a telescopic sight, a laser rangefinder, and is mounted on a
65-ton tripod. In that case, you don't have 1 round to dodge, but
several dozen.

As for the top-attack missile - when is it going to be fired? Who's
going to guide it? How are they going to maintian guidance for the
20-60 seconds it will take to reach its target while riding in a
moving/evading/exploding SUV?

> To deal with the US Air Force...
> Buy old airliners and fit with reloadable missile launchers and modern AA
> radar, counter measures, and refueling probe. Take old fighter designs, and
> hang them fully fueled and armed from ballons. That'll multiply thier
> endurance by a factor of ten at least. Fit search-radar in envelope and have
> them patrol your boarder. Network them together and you'll have an end to
> surprise US attacks.

I'd pay good money to see an F-104/Mirage II/MiG-21 launched from a
balloon.If you could make that one work, Ringling Brothers would give
you a contract But Quick. As for refrobbing old airliners as
long-endurance Patrol Fighter AWACS - well, first, they're easy to
detect, and therefore, neutralize. You can either shoot them down,
or go around them. Being airliners, their ability to move crossrange
will be poor. They'll also need improved airbases, and, as you
mention, tankers. WHen the bases disappear, so does your Air Defence.
(It's always struck me as amusing how many folks seem to think that
all you need to improve aircraft range is a probe. You also need
tankers. Lats of tankers. Lots of big tankers. Consider that in
1982, the RAF used its entire tanker force to get one Vulcan from
Ascention Island to Port Stanley. (Victors, in this case - Not a lot
of tankers, and not a lot of transfer fuel. The same mission could
have been flown, by the U.Ss. with 3 aircraft - 1 B-52, and 2 KC-135s.
The U.S. tanker fleet alone outnumbers most other nations entire Air
Forces.

> To deal with the US Navy...
> Buy old torpedos and fit to larch home made rockets (see X-prize entries)
> with 50-100 mile range. Get the rockets to dump the torpedos within a few
> miles of a nimitz carrier groups and you're garanteed to blow up something
> *really* expensive!

A _lot_ harder than you think. And the launches will be detected. A
Numitz at flank speed would be a significant distance from the inital
impact area before the Super ASROC you've described gets there. At
which point, the torp, if it survives the impact intact (not a trivial
thing), is goig to have a hard time finding a profitable target.
In the meantime, you've now 1: Revealed your intentions in an
unambiguous manner, and 2: Nicely marked all of your launching
sites. making it damned hard to clain that it wasn't your doing.
Teh end effect, even if you do hit a ship, would be an awful lot like
kicking a nest of Africanized Bees.

> Alternatively buy the following:
> 1 million RPG-7s
> 5 million RPG-7 rounds
> 10 million AK-74s
> 1 billion bullets
> Distribute evenly through out your population, train them, set up a
> Swiss-style monitoring system, and let the Americans invade. Then blow up
> everything of value they own the second they let their guard down. They'll
> leave in a few months and you can go back to normal.
>

In order to do that, you have to have a population that thinks the
country you're leading is worth fighting for. But then, countries
that its citizens thing are worth fighting for tend not to be high
profile targets to the U.S.

> Alternatively fly a few airliners into american nuclear power stations. The
> aftermath of multiple chernobles will destroy America as an effective
> strategic power.

Well, the onlu problem with _that_ one is that Chyernoble, bas as
it was, didn't depopulate large stretches of the Ukraine or Russia.
U.S. racotrs have far superior containment, and, in fact, are required
to be designed such that they can shrug off a direct hit from a large
airliner.

You are the illegitemate son of Robert S. Macnamara, and I claim my 5.00!

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 17:41:33 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 09:12:47 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr. > wrote:
>>
>>LOL.... now you're talking about *multiple* lauch & storage facilities,
>
>Launch facility = a land rover and trailer
>
And how big is this missile? Unless it's very small, the land rover
is now restricted to the roads-- they don't pull heavy loads through
off road territory that easily, and any 150KM+ missile will be a
heavy load, plus the radio and data link equipment.



>storage facility = any building will do
>
>>for
>>potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
>>same small targets *simultaneously*?
>
>co-ordination = radio
>
What radio? the U.S. will have every frequency jammed-- we
practically own the radio spectrum. Also, that sort of time on target
tactic takes a lot of training-- and most 3rd world countries don't
have it.
To put it this way, at no point during either GW I or II was the
Iraqi military, much larger, with many hardened facilities, able to
pull off this sort of coordination.

>>The infrastructure and technology for
>>that undertaking would be even more cost prohibitive, but just as futile.
>>Even if they were somehow built and tested (extraordinarily unlikely);
>>again, what would stop *all* of these facilities from being taken out in the
>>first 10 seconds of the war?
>
>Knowing where they are?
>
>Did the USA knock out all Iraqu tanks at the start of the 2003 or
>1991 wars? No, it did not, unlike in your worthless comtemptable
>idiot strawman scenario. Did the USA knock out all Serbian tanks in
>the Kosovo war? they didn't in the whole war, let alone the first
>ten minutes.

WE didn't have to-- but we did knock out the Iraqi Air defense
system, and for something like 60 days in 1991 got to play, "Smash the
army". The tanks couldn't hurt us. The scuds stayed hidden, but that
was because they were doing individual launches. The U.S. won't come
charging in like a blind bull-- it'll hit you from the air, slowly
degrading your command and control abilities. If you want to come to
us, fine-- you have to put the equipoment on the road. Remember the
Highway of Death? If we're invading you, its back to deciding do we
want to go fast, or spend a few weeks destroying your ability to
resist? After plowing all the money into this systems, you certainly
aren't going to have many tanks, infantry worthy of the name, or
airpower, so ALL the U.S. has to do is kill this one system.
Not an effective strategy. Not at all.

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 20:03:48 GMT, Charles Gray > wrote:
>>co-ordination = radio
>>
> What radio? the U.S. will have every frequency jammed

And then the USA won't be able to use radio either.

>-- we
>practically own the radio spectrum. Also, that sort of time on target
>tactic takes a lot of training-- and most 3rd world countries don't
>have it.
> To put it this way, at no point during either GW I or II was the
>Iraqi military, much larger, with many hardened facilities, able to
>pull off this sort of coordination.

They weren't exactly the most competent army the world has ever
seen, were they? When officers are promoted for politcal reliability
instead of competence, that's what you expect to happen.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 18:15:56 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 13:43:49 -0500, Ray Drouillard > wrote:
>>
>>Also, since it's not encrypted, it can be spoofed using a local
>>transmitter
>
>That doesn't logically follow; it's possible to make non-encrypted
>data that can't be faked, you just use a digital signature.

If you don't go to spread-spectrum, your radio links will probably be
jammed. (Solution - go to spread spectrum).

Spread spectrum signals will be difficult to separate from noise,
except at very close range, where the total power level is noticable
above the broadband noise.

I'd still rate a radio location system using spread spectrum
transmitters as rather vulnerable, because the transmitters have to
remain in a fixed location for the system to work, and would be prime
targets.

In article >,
(Jack Linthicum) wrote:

> Chad Irby > wrote in message
> >...

> > He then went to a low-tech communications mode, to "beat" the high-tech
> > intel that the US normally gets when fighting against pretty much anyone
> > else in the real world, and expected to have 100% effectiveness in
> > fighting the game. Of course, his low-tech methods (motorcycle couriers
> > and personal communications) were degraded by the exercise monitors,
> > like they would be in real life.
> >
>
> Present situation seems to duplicate that low tech communications
> mode. So far.

With even *less* effect. The attacks in Iraq show very little - or no -
central command and control. If there was any sort of command structure
left in Iraq, we'd be seeing multiple large attacks, at lightly-defended
targets, with some reasonably serious effects. So far, it's more of a
copycat war, where something works once, a few other folks try it, and
then it stops working because the US changes tactics.

> > Some of the other results were very much non-real, like sneak attacks
> > that only succeeded because the one guy sitting at a terminal was
> > looking something up, and missed the first warnings - something that
> > couldn't happen in reality, with hundreds of people out there to notice
> > troop movements.
> >
> You are assuming 'troop movements' the present situation is guys
> hiding in mosques or behind children ambushing GIs who get out of the
> protective zone.

No, the exercise did. In the current situation, there's nothing much
going on besides some fairly random attacks.

> > The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
> > optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction of
> > the deaths and a shorter war.
>
> We expected a war from March to way past December?

No, we expected the actual war to last a few months, and continued
operations to last for years.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In article >,
(Denyav) wrote:

> For others, more attack platforms guided by Mk.I eyeballs and armed with box
> cutters.

....and not being very effective. The classical "hijack an airplane"
tactic will no longer work with any amount of reliability, if at all.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 21:02:04 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> We expected a war from March to way past December?
>
>No, we expected the actual war to last a few months, and continued
>operations to last for years.


I don't think anyone expected such a collapse-- most serious
predictoins I read expected a fairly easy field war, followed by some
ugly city fighting, as Saddam tried to suck the U.S. into a Berlin
style slugfest.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 22:17:34 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>>>The problems listed above are information-processing problems, that
>>>is, software problems. Does it really require billions of dollars to
>>>solve these problems? I say no: a few small groups of really
>>>competent programms can be many times more productive than how
>>>software is traditionally written.
>>
>>The issue isn't programmers Phil. The issue the massive amounts of
>>R&D to develop the information needed to specify the sensor that the
>>programmers will process the output of.
>
>The sensors needed are visual and IR imaging. It doesn't require a
>massive R&D program to determine that, or to decide which
>combinations of number of pixels and widths of field of view are
>appropriate.

Ah, another problem handwaved away. You not only lack a clue, you are
aggressive in avoiding obtaining one.

>>The issue is the massive
>>amount of R&D needed to develop the algorithms the programmers will
>>implement to analyze the output of the sensor.
>
>Do you know anything about programming? If you did, you'd know that
>developing algorithms is what programmers do.

Do *you* know anything about programming? If you did, you'd know that
developing the algorithm and implementing the same are two different,
howsoever intertwined, processes.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 18:56:18 GMT, Derek Lyons
> wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>>
>>>>You have a rather optimistic view of the capabilities of most nations to
>>>>handle development of truly accurate x-y-z topo data sets. And once you do
>>>>have that data, you have to have a guidance system that can read it, remain
>>>>compact enough to fit in your missile,
>>>
>>>You do realise, you can get hard disks small enought otfit in your
>>>hand, that store tens of gigabytes these days?
>>
>>You do realize the problem isn't *storing* the data,
>
>If you were more literate, you would realise that I was replying to
>the the point "remain compact enough to fit in your missile".

If you were more literate, you would realize that you adressed only
half the statement you replied to. Which is typical, as you have a
history in this thread of avoiding or handwaving away the hard parts.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 19:05:46 GMT, Derek Lyons > wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
>>
>>>> DR is a non-starter--again, you don't just hurl a few
>>>>missiles in the general direction of the bad guys and say, "Gee, that was
>>>>tough--time for a beer!"
>>>
>>>Again, why would DR not work?
>>
>>Because all navigation system accumulate inaccuracy as time-of-flight
>>increases.
>
>Well, that's obvious. it's how quickly it accumulates innaccuracy
>that matters.

Given your lapses to date, I don't assume you know anything, as you've
displayed massive ignorance so far.

>> Without periodic updates, you are almost ensured of
>>failing to hit your target.
>
>Unless you have some other method of terminal guidance.

ROTFLMAO. First you have to get into the area where terminal guidance
can take over.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

(phil hunt) wrote:

>> - so you're limited
>>to fighting wars after dark on cloudless nights with no flares in the
>>sky. LORAN is a radio broadcast and therefore not survivable against a
>>US-style opponent.
>
>If you have lots of transmitters, many of which are dummy
>transmitters, and many of which are only turned on for a short time,
>using frequency hopping, it's rather harder to destroy the network.

No, it's *easy* to destroy the network. Just knock down every antenna
in the nation over 100' tall. *poof* No more LORAN network.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Jack Linthicum" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...
> > >
> > > > The funny thing is that the *real* world results were even more
> > > > optimistic than the expected results from the exercise... a fraction
of
> > > > the deaths and a shorter war.
> > >
> > > We expected a war from March to way past December?
> >
> > Recommend you go back to misunderstanding the wierd world of your
mythical
> > micro-nukes, Jack--this subject is obviously beyond your comprehension
> > level.
>
> Then we did expect a war to last from onset to at least nine months?
> It is still going on you know.

Intelligent individuals with half a clue realized that during the
stabilization/support/reconstruction phase there would be continued
violence. It did not surprise the military--that you were apparently caught
flat-footed implies something a bit different.

Brooks

(phil hunt) wrote:
>On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 09:12:47 GMT, Thomas J. Paladino Jr. > wrote:
>>
>>LOL.... now you're talking about *multiple* lauch & storage facilities,
>
>Launch facility = a land rover and trailer

Which need gas and maintenance.

>storage facility = any building will do

*goggles* Not even remotely Clyde. Storing fueled & armed cruise
missiles is a dangerous task. Putting them in 'any old building' is a
damn good way to kill half a city... your own.

>>for potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
>>same small targets *simultaneously*?
>
>co-ordination = radio

It's not the method of communication that's the hard part. It's
actually gathering all the data (hard), synthesizing it and generating
launch orders (very hard), and then transmitting it to hundreds of
launch locations (hard). All these things you handwave away have
hidden complexities.

>Did the USA knock out all Iraqu tanks at the start of the 2003 or
>1991 wars? No, it did not, unlike in your worthless comtemptable
>idiot strawman scenario. Did the USA knock out all Serbian tanks in
>the Kosovo war? they didn't in the whole war, let alone the first
>ten minutes.

They didn't have to kill all the tanks. Instead they went after the
command and control structure, which renders the tanks almost as
useless as if they were scattered across the terrain.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.